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ABSTRACT

The Power Behind the Constitution: The Supreme Court
by
Sallie Raye Trudden

The framers of the Constitution designed a document to be the “Supreme Law of the
Land” and within its pages a branch of government, a federal judiciary, never before
envisioned. The Constitution, along with the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, set the
framework for building the strongest branch of government, the Supreme Court.
Historical events and court decisions with few exceptions strengthened the power of the
judiciary contributing to its authority. The Supreme Court Justices, by interpreting the
Constitution and judging the legality of laws instituted by both state and federal
legislatures, solidified its superior position in the government hierarchy. An examination
of documents, case decisions, and the results of these decisions for the nation add
credence to the assertion that of the three branches of government the strongest and most
powerful was and is the Supreme Court.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The citizens of the United States live in a country that has developed a unique set
of laws by a government formed under a constitution written and adopted over two
hundred years ago. Many Americans agree that for the most part they live in a good
society; however, philosophers since Plato have sought to determine the nature and
meaning of a “good society,” a good state and a set of just laws.1 Plato‟s political
philosophy centered on the individual as the most important aspect of society, and he
considered virtuous people as the core group of a political aristocracy that was a necessity
for a competent ruling class. According to Plato, the ruling class required education and
training.2 Even the most astute observer of the process of policymaking, including laws
and regulations, can not always distinguish which of the three branches of government in
the United States is the most powerful.
The writers of the Constitution of the United States created a document that
radically changed the Articles of Confederation, a document that had loosely united the
colonies during most of the Revolutionary War. The “new” constitutional government
was constructed with three branches of government; the executive branch consisting of a

1

William S. Sahakian and Mabel Lewis Sahakian, Ideas of Great Philosophers, (New York:
Barnes and Noble, Inc., 1966), 59.
2
Plato, The Republic, trans. Desmond Lee (London: Penguin Books, 1955), 63.
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President and Vice-President, the Congressional branch with a House of Representatives
and a Senate, and a Federal Judiciary branch. The power and responsibilities of the
legislative and executive branches were more clearly defined in the Constitution than
were those of the judicial branch; yet the authors, many of whom were lawyers, perceived
that a federal judiciary, a body to decide the power of federal law over state law, was
extremely important. At the same time many, including Alexander Hamilton, professed
publicly that it would be and perhaps should be the weakest branch of the government.
In Federalist number 78, Hamilton wrote, “that the judiciary, from the nature of its
functions, will always be the least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution,
because it will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure them.”3 Hamilton posited that
because the legislature would have control of the purse and the executive the sword, the
power of the judiciary would effectively be reduced. Hamilton, professing this belief,
relied on the writings of Montesquieu, “Of the three powers above mentioned, the
Judiciary is next to nothing.”4 Hamilton continued his argument stating individual
oppression might come from the court on occasion but fear for the general liberty of the
people was unnecessary from a federal judiciary separated from the other branches. 5
Hamilton further explained the judges would be required to consider and uphold the
Constitution of the United States as the fundamental law of the nation and thus be
expected to interpret laws made by the legislative branch with these criteria in mind.6
3

Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay, The Federalist Papers, with an introduction
by Clinton Rossiter (New York: The New American Library, 1961), 465.
4
Charles Montesquieu, Spirit of Laws, trans., Thomas Nugent (New York: Colonial Press,
1899), 186.
5
Hamilton, 466.
5
Hamilton, 467.
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Also Hamilton wrote in number 78 The Federalist Papers that the Supreme Court
would be an intermediate body between the people and the legislature in order, among
other things, to keep the legislature within the limits of authority it was assigned by the
Constitution. Hamilton perceived that establishing a federal Supreme Court was essential
for the new republic in order for the principles of justice interpreted from the Constitution
to be uniformly applied throughout the emerging nation.7 In order to further understand
the importance of a federal judiciary it is necessary to begin with a clearer understanding
of the importance of law for the colonial mindset and how that mindset developed in the
growth of power that has made the Supreme Court the most powerful branch of the
government in the United States.

7

Stephen P. Powers and Stanley Rothman, The Least Dangerous Branch?: Consequences of
Judicial Activism (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2002), 17.
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CHAPTER 2
THE CREATION OF A NATIONAL CONSTITUTION

Once the colonists secured independence from England forming what would be a
new nation the major concern of those who wielded power was how the new alliance
would be organized to conduct the business of nationhood. All of the colonies had
legislative bodies that had made local and colonial laws supposedly under the auspices of
the English King and Parliament. The citizens of the colonies had an obsessive suspicion
of any political power that operated from a distance, especially after the problems
developed between England and the colonies had escalated into the Revolutionary
conflict. The era of the American Revolution was a period of political paranoia.1
Many in the colonies sensed that a powerful central government would merely
duplicate the principles of monarchy and the aristocracy they were attempting to separate
themselves from.2 A great many leaders, along with the average colonial citizen, were
educated in the history of the British monarchy and English Constitutional law. The
emergence of colonial voices in the legislatures of the colonies questioned the belief that
a King ruled by Divine Right and that he had no equal within his realm. These voices
culminated in the words which are a crucial part of the Declaration of Independence; “All
men are created equal with unalienable rights including life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness and that these rights must be protected by a government derived from the

1

Lance Banning, “Republican Ideology and the Triumph of the Constitution, 1789-1793,”
William and Mary Quarterly, Third Series, Vol. 31, No. 2 (Apr., 1974), 171.
2
Joseph J. Ellis Founding Brothers: The Revolutionary Generation (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 2001), 7.
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consent of the governed.” Many of the grievances against England that were stated in the
Declaration of Independence concerned the making and enforcing of laws, the
administration of justice, and the powers of legislative bodies in the various colonies.
Once the colonies ratified the Declaration of Independence and war had
commenced, the members of the Continental Congress began the job of writing a
document in order to provide a legal framework for the Union of Free and Independent
States. The document they proposed would be enforceable as the law of the new union.
Even though John Dickinson had refused to sign the Declaration of Independence, he was
appointed head of the committee to propose the new government. Dickinson proposed a
strong central government, one having control over the western lands, having equal
representation for the states, and having the power to levy taxes.3 Members of the
Continental Congress drastically changed the Articles before sending them to the states
for ratification because of the fears presented by relinquishing local power to a strong
central government. Under the Articles each state kept its sovereignty and the functions
of the federal government were carefully specified and extremely limited. Despite these
limitations on the power of a federal government, it took from November, 1777 until
March, 1781 for the final ratification of the Articles of Confederation. The ratification
took place only seven and one half months before the surrender of Lord Cornwallis and
the British Army at Yorktown on October 19, 1781.4
Over the next several years state and federal leaders realized that the Articles of
Confederation contained many defects. John Jay admitted that, “our federal government
3

Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union 1777, http://www.barefootsworld.net/aoc
1777.html accessed 8 December 2006. 1.
4
Articles, 2.
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has imperfections, which time and more experience will, I hope, effectually remedy.”5 In
a letter to Edward Carrington, Thomas Jefferson wrote that “with all the imperfections of
our present government, it is without comparison the best existing or that ever did exist.”6
Yet there were enough disorders in the states by the more democratic, radical elements to
convince most conservative, wealthy state leaders that a stronger federal government was
needed. These conservative-minded men were ready to give up a measure of state
sovereignty to protect their property and wealth.
The navigation of interior waterways was by 1785 becoming a national problem
and asserted itself with negotiations between Maryland and Virginia concerning the
Potomac River. The plans for expanding use of the waterway for westward moment also
involved Pennsylvania. George Washington, who was involved with the project, hosted a
meeting of commissioners from Maryland and Virginia at Mount Vernon in March, 1785
and a compact was ratified and forwarded to the state‟s assemblies. Even though James
Madison had not been present at the conference he led the fight for its adoption in the
Virginia State Legislature. Madison was aware of the need for a larger conference with
more states being represented and had discussed this possibility with Washington.7
After the adoption of the Mount Vernon resolution by Virginia, James Madison
devised a plan calling for another convention, one that would have national
consequences, in Annapolis. Not wanting to draw suspicion about nationalistic causes
behind the call for a convention, Madison coyly attributed the proposal to John Tyler.
5

John Jay to Lord Landsdowne, 16 April, 1786. Correspondence and Public Papers of John Jay,
Vol. 3, ed. H. P. Johnston (New York: G.P. Putnam‟s Sons, 1890-93), 188-190.
6
Thomas Jefferson to Edward Carrington, 4 August, 1787. Writings of Jefferson, ed. Paul
Leicester Ford (New York, G.P. Putnam‟s Sons, 1892-99), 423-425.
7
Richard B. Morris, Witnesses At the Creation: Hamilton, Madison, Jay, and the Constitution
(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1985), 163.
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The proposal was passed by the Virginia legislature, who then appointed commissioners
to join delegates from other states in Annapolis, Maryland for the purpose of forming
trade regulations promoting the general interests of all. While Madison indicated to
intimate friends his bold objectives of changing the Articles of Confederation, he gave
the outward appearance of one who thought they could be mended. Commissioners from
only five of the thirteen states reached Annapolis for the conference and Maryland
decided not to send delegates considering the meeting as transgressing the powers of
Congress. James Madison arrived at Annapolis early and immediately sought the
whereabouts of Alexander Hamilton, who did not arrive for three days. The two men had
several private meetings about the upcoming conference, and each man sought out the
other delegates for conversational meals where proposals and objectives for the genera
meeting were discussed. When the meeting convened only twelve delegates representing
five states were present, and they realized it would be useless to proceed. However, the
convention unanimously adopted a proposal to be sent to Congress calling for a
Convention to meet in May for the purpose of correcting defects in the Articles of
Confederation, thus the Annapolis trade convention led directly to the call for a federal
convention.8 Congress referred the proposal to committee and after four months
cautiously endorsed the proposal. Congress described the purpose for the convention as
“for the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation and reporting
in Congress and the several legislatures such alterations and provisions therein.”9

8

Max Ferrand, “The Federal Constitution and the Defects of the Confederation,” The American
Political Science Review, Vol. 2, No. 4 (Nov., 1908), 533.
9
Morris, 165-68.
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Prior to the scheduled meeting in Philadelphia an insurrection in Massachusetts
known as Shay‟s Rebellion illustrated both the economic problems the nation was facing
and the growing disunity among the citizens of the various states. The insurgents, some
two thousand farmers, conspired in an effort to close the Massachusetts state courts in
order to stop sheriff‟s auctions and prevent farm foreclosures. Although the rebellion
was brought under control rapidly, similar but less militant movements in other states
symbolized for some how fragile the nation was under the Articles.10 The convention had
been convened to revise the Articles in order to make them adequate and to preserve the
union between the states. Among the list of defects of the government under the Articles
of Confederation compiled from writings of the delegates prior to the meeting are several
concerned with judicial powers.11 Under the Articles there was no separate federal
judicial branch of government and the only judicial authority Congress possessed was the
power to arbitrate disputes between states.12
The members of the Constitutional Convention included more than twenty men
trained in the law with several being judges of the Supreme Court in their respective
states and one, George Wythe, a professor of Law at the University of William and Mary
in Virginia.13 Because of their legal training, some of these men realized one of the main
problems they faced was establishing adequate safeguards for private rights along with
placing adequate power in the hands of a national government.14 Most of these men were

10

Ron Chernow, Alexander Hamilton (New York: Penguin Books, 2004), 225.
Ferrand, 536.
12
“Articles,” 4.
13
“The Framers of the Constitution,” http://usconstitution.net/constframe.html accessed 2 June,
2006, 1-8.
14
Edward S. Corwin, Essays on American Constitutional History, eds. Alpheus R. Mason and
Gerald Garvey (New York: Harper and Roe, 1964), 1.
11
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educated in the democratic philosophy of Jean Jacques Rousseau. Rousseau favored a
republican form of government ruled by laws afforded their power by a government of
popular elected officials.15 In most respects the framers of the Constitution were
concerned with laws; especially how they would be made, judged, and enforced. The
tone of the proceedings changed drastically once the delegates decided it was impossible
to fix the Articles of Confederation and the only solution was to write a new document.
The delegates decided to meet in secret committees behind locked and guarded doors
because of the nature of their work and the fears they knew were present in the people.
Because of the major influence Thomas Jefferson had on the writing of the Declaration of
Independence it is of some importance to note that he was not present at the time of the
Constitutional convention but in France where he was quite upset about the fact that
everything was being done in secret and to a lesser extent so were John Jay, who
remained in New York but lobbied the delegates at the convention when possible, and
John Adams, in London.16
In correcting the defects in the Articles of Confederation by writing the new
constitution the authors only “check upon state legislation” was the provision in Article
VI that State Constitutions or laws shall not interfere with the “Supreme Law of the
Land.”17 The idea of a “government of laws and not men,” proposed by James
Harrington in 1656 in Commonwealth of Oceana influenced the writers of the
Constitution. Harrington explained that law “is a legal limit on government; it is the

15

Sahakian, 73-74.
Morris, 186-188.
17
Ferrand, 540.
16
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antithesis of arbitrary rule; its opposite is despotic government, the government of will
instead of law.”18
After many comprises the Committee of Style wrote the final draft of the
Constitution, with the preamble and obligation of contract clauses being written by
Gouverneur Morris of New York.19 Even though the Articles of Confederation had been
adequate to a small degree for the country during the Revolutionary War it had become
unworkable for the group of states in order for them to grow and become a viable entity
in the world. The struggle at the Constitutional Convention would be one over where the
power of government should reside; with the individual states or with a strong, powerful
central government. A large number of those who had observed the problems under the
Articles of Confederation realized that if the fledgling nation was going to survive, it
needed to unite with a strong federal government rather than align themselves as thirteen
independent entities in a federation.20
Americans had grown accustomed to enjoying a wide array of liberties under the
distant regulations of the English monarchs until the reign of George III. These liberties
were tightly bound in the colonial laws and constitutions governing the various colonies.
The Massachusetts Body of Liberties of 1641 influenced a large number of colonial
governments because it guaranteed freedom of speech and petition at public meetings, the

18

Jethro K. Lieberman, The Enduring Constitution: A Bicentennial Perspective (New York:
Barnes and Nobles, Inc., 1966), 73-74.
19
Lieberman, 13.
20
Morris, 200.
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right of counsel, trial by jury, and the same justice and law for every person.21 After the
French and Indian War, England restricted the colonial courts thus making some of the
laws moot precipitating the colonists revolt. The writers of the Declaration of
Independence attempted to make legal the revolt against the authority of English rule and
law. The framers of the Constitution proposed a document making it the foundation
around which a central power would control through laws produced by a legislative body,
enforced by an executive body, and adjudicated by a Federal Judiciary whose purpose
was to interpret the meaning of the Constitution, intended to be the “Supreme Law of the
Land,” enforceable by the courts. It became a symbol of national loyalty and evoked
both emotional and intellectual support from Americans. It stood for liberty, equality
before the law, and limited government and was considered a part of the American creed.
The Constitution was designed as a supreme and binding law that both granted and
limited powers and with the establishment of a federal court system would insure
uniformity of judgments concerning federal laws.22
When the deliberations in Philadelphia were made public there arose a storm of
protest and condemnations of the actions taken at the convention. Opposition was not
limited to the judiciary article of the Constitution but extended to the whole document.
Remembering how long it had taken to ratify the Articles of Confederation, the delegates
had provided that once two-thirds of the state conventions had approved it would take

21

Joyce Appleby, “The American Heritage: The Heirs and the Disinherited,” Journal of American
History (December, 1987), 808.
22
Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Faith (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988),
47-52.
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effect. No provision of the Constitution was subjected to more severe condemnation and
subjected to greater fears and apprehension than the article on the
judiciary. What a large number of people were troubled about was principally the
relationship of the lower federal courts to existing state tribunals. Most gave little
thought to the power the Supreme Court would have in declaring laws unconstitutional.23

23

Leo Pfeffer, This Honorable Court: A History of the United States Supreme Court (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1965), 26-27.
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CHAPTER 3
THE FEDERALIST PAPERS AND RATIFICATION

In establishing American nationhood the first step had been the Declaration of
Independence and the final declaration was the ratification of the Constitution of the
United States. George Washington subscribed to the belief that the republic to be
established by the Constitution created a government of laws that must be obeyed once
the duly elected representatives had reached a decision.1 Anticipating that many
politicians would be anti-federalists, the signers of the Constitution provided for state
ratification by popularly elected conventions and stipulated the Constitution would go
into effect as soon as nine states ratified. Although Alexander Hamilton, an aristocrat and
plutocrat, signed the Constitution, he did not have complete faith in the liberties it
secured, and he favored rule by an elite made up of the rich.2 Hamilton was present for
only part of the Constitutional debates because with him was two anti-federalist delegates
from New York who constantly overruled his opinions, hence he became frustrated and
left the convention to return in July and for part of August.3 When Hamilton returned to
the convention the other two delegates had returned to New York to report to Governor
George Clinton who was opposed to the new Constitution. Hamilton was the only

1

Joseph J. Ellis, Founding Brothers: The Revolutionary Generation (New York: Vintage Books,
2002), 145.
2
Richard Brookheiser, Alexander Hamilton: American (New York: The Free Press, 1999), 4.
3
Brookheiser, 62.
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delegate from New York to sign the document. He realized the importance of the
ratification of the new Constitution for the nation and was aware of the opposition in
New York backed by Clinton.4
Almost immediately, Alexander Hamilton began a campaign in New York to
assure ratification of the Constitution. Hamilton persuaded and plotted and bullied his
fellow New Yorkers to obtain a narrow margin in the convention aided immensely with
the addition literary contributions he proposed. Hamilton conceived the idea of a series
of twenty-five essays to be published and distributed in New York explaining the merits
and meaning of the Constitution. He first asked Gouverneur Morris to be a contributor
but Morris declined. His second choice was William Duer but Hamilton reconsidered and
decided to commission John Jay and James Madison, who both accepted.5 Jay, who had
served as minister to Spain, was not among the delegation that framed the Constitution
because Clinton did not appoint him, possible because as President of the Congress under
the Articles of Confederation in 1779 Jay had espoused the cause of national supremacy.
No doubt Hamilton knew of Jay‟s life of subterfuge having been the organizer and
operator of a spy ring during the Revolutionary War. Jay had drafted the New York State
Constitution which clearly reflected the constitutional ideas of John Adams, who helped
write the Massachusetts state constitution and believed in a strong central government.6
Madison and Hamilton had already plotted and led the fight for a vastly expanded
national government with sovereign power over the states making Madison a good choice

4
5
6

Brookheiser, 68.
Brookheiser, 69.
Morris, 71-74.
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to aid in battling for ratification in both New York and his home state of Virginia.7 The
essay project when completed would contain a total of eighty-five essays, most being
written by Hamilton. However, the authorship of the essays would remain anonymous
with all scribers using the pseudonym Publius. The essays became known collectively as
The Federalist Papers. These essays while only a part of the material used by Federalists
in their quest to secure ratification of the constitution have become an integral part in
legal interpretations of the meaning the founding fathers intended in the words of the
document.8
While there were several areas of contention in the Constitution some needed to
be explained and defended in more detail than others. The essays written by John Jay
and James Madison, both lawyers, add insight into the arguments being debated about
the organization of the government under the Constitution. Most realized once the
Constitution was ratified it would become the “Supreme Law” of the land and the
citizens would need to be educated about what it encompassed. The Constitution had
been designed to create a government eliminating many of the problems apparent
during the years under the Articles of Confederation. One shortfall, specifically the
lack of a federal judiciary as part of a strong central government, had created both
internal and external problems because there was no court in which to settle disputes
between states or between states and a foreign government. Each state maintained its

7
8

Ellis, 54.
Morris, 78-80.
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own court system and was unresponsive to the interests of another state. Treaties made
by one or by Congress under the Articles of Confederation were often ignored in the
courts of any other state.9
Furthermore, Alexander Hamilton, a prominent lawyer, acknowledged along
with many others the importance of a strong judiciary although he realized a number of
people feared such an overpowering national judiciary, believing it had the potential to
dictate to the states. Hamilton and others perceived the need for a strong federal
judiciary as an aid in the instruction and understanding of the new Constitution.
Among the delegates at the convention had been thirty-four lawyers trained in English
common law as expounded by seventeenth and eighteenth century jurists.10 Given the
abuses of the English monarch and Parliament, the framers of the constitution believed
other institutions were more likely to aggrandize power than the courts.11 In number 22
The Federalist Papers, Hamilton points out one of the defects of the Articles as a lack
of a federal judiciary needed to expound and define the true meaning and operation of
laws. He continued that treaties to have any force had to be considered the law of the
land and their import had to be ascertained by judicial determinations submitted in the
last resort to one “Supreme Tribunal.”12 The language Hamilton used in writing the
Federalist number 78 was calculated to minimize suspicion and fears of a federal court,

9

Morris, 162.
Brookheiser, 170.
11
Stephen P. Powers and Stanley Rothman, The Least Dangerous Branch: Consequences of
Judicial Activist (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2002), 3.
12
Hamilton, Federalist, 150.
10

20

although he held the belief that a strong and independent judiciary was necessary to
maintain the integrity of the Constitution.13 Hamilton believed the judiciary‟s complete
independence was essential because the legislature could not be the constituted judge of
its own powers without compromising the legality of laws. He visualized the courts as
an intermediate body between the people and the legislatures in order to keep the
legislature within bounds, and he denied this role placed the judiciary in a superior
position to the legislatures.14
Additionally, John Jay, who had served two years on the Supreme Court of New
York, was sensitive to the fears shared by many Anti-federalists of a large federal
judiciary administering a body of federal common law and in the process undermining
state court authority.15 Jay also realized the necessity of a strong central government
from his experience as President of Congress in 1779, when he took the position that
the Articles of Confederation ratified by most states was a functioning body and
stressed the supremacy of the judicial rulings of the Congress over those of the state
courts. Jay drafted the resolution in 1787 on the supremacy of treaties and supported
enlarging the power of Congress concerning powers of taxation and regulation of
commerce.16 In a 1786 letter to Thomas Jefferson, Jay wrote of his displeasure with
having a legislative, an executive, and a judicial power vested in one body and

13
14
15
16

Morris, 46.
Morris, 47.
Morris, 50 Pfeffer, 37.
Morris, 190.
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concluded that these powers should be forever separated and distributed in such a way
as to serve as checks and balances on each other.17 In Federalist number 3, Jay argued
concerning the necessity of treaties and continued by saying the framers demonstrated
wisdom in placing the interpretation of treaties under the jurisdiction and judgment of
the courts appointed by and responsible to one national government, however, in his
final draft he omitted the phrase “national courts.”18 In Article III of the Constitution,
the delegates side stepped the issue of courts, creating a Supreme Court and what other
inferior courts the Congress might ordain and establish. Jay again argued the need for a
strong central government instead of thirteen disunited states or several confederacies
that might open the nation to invasion by outside forces and collapse. He completed his
argument stating one nation would more ably provide a strong defense and reestablish
public credit.19 A continuing question which the authors of The Federalist Papers
carefully avoided was which of the three branches of the national government might
have the potential for becoming stronger than the others.
The third contributor to the essays was James Madison whose initial
centralizing plan of government, with some important compromises, was the one finally
adopted at the Constitutional Convention. Madison proposed that the national
supremacy be extended to include a judiciary department with appeal to the national
tribunal in all cases concerning foreigners or citizens of other states and an assumption

17

Morris, 191.
Jay, Federalist, 43-44.
19
Morris, 51.
20
Morris, 196.
18
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by the national judiciary of all cases involving admiralty disputes.20 During the
convention procedures, Madison participated in many debates and kept the most careful
records of what was said and done that are available. He contributed twenty-nine
essays to The Federalist Papers and was a principal leader defending and supporting
ratification of the Constitution in Virginia where the convention was evenly divided.
After heated debates with Patrick Henry, the main Anti-federalist and adversary of a
federal judiciary, the Virginia Convention followed Madison and unconditionally
ratified the Constitution.21 In The Federalist number 51, Madison wrote, “In framing a
government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in
this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place
oblige it to control itself.”22
Although The Federalist Papers were published in New York, the state did not
ratify the Constitution until after it was considered in operation because nine states had
accepted it. In other states various pamphlets and other propaganda was used by both
those for ratification and those opposed. John Adams was a driving force for
ratification in Massachusetts and federalist groups were lead by prominent individuals
in other states. The thirteen states had agreed to a division of power relinquishing
authority to a central power for common purposes.23 Now would begin the task of

21

Morris, 238 and Ellis, 52.
Madison, Federalist, 322.
23
Corwin, 147.
22

23

setting up the government and strengthening its powers to consolidate the individual
interests of the states in order to remain a viable entity and increase the respect and
influence of the country around the world. The process naturally began with the
election of the members of Congress and the election of a chief executive, George
Washington.

24

CHAPTER 4
THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789 AND THE PRE-MARSHALL COURT

In writing the Constitution the framers merely authorized Congress to establish
federal courts working below the level of a Supreme Court. The number of members in
both federal courts and the Supreme Court was not set but left to the discretion of
Congress to decide. The Constitution offered little guidance on how to structure the
federal judiciary system. Article III of the Constitution concerned the judiciary and was
the shortest but significant in that it was designed to insure a rule of law freed from
political pressure by proposing life tenure for Supreme Court Justices.24
One of the main orders of business for the first Congress was to establish a federal
judiciary with lesser courts. A Senate committee was appointed to write a proposal for
the new court system. William Paterson, a delegate at the Constitutional Convention, and
Oliver Ellsworth, later Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, were the main contributors to
what would become the Judiciary Act of 1789. The Act was approved September 24,
1789, and established the judicial courts for the United States.25
The Act established a three-level court system with the top tier being the Supreme
Court consisting of a Chief Justice and five Associate Justices with any four being a
quorum and court sessions scheduled twice a year. The United States was divided into
thirteen districts, one for each state, with each district court having original jurisdiction of
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all suits that under the Constitution could be brought in federal courts, with the exception
of those that could be brought directly to the Supreme Court. Each district would have
one judge who should reside in the district for which he was appointed and hold session
four times a year or more at the discretion of the judge. The districts were combined into
three circuits; the eastern, the middle, and the southern circuit with each circuit to
convene twice a year and have present any two Supreme Court justices and the district
justice, a quorum being met by the presence of any two. Specific dates were set for each
court session to convene. Oaths or affirmations required for clerks, judges, and justices
were outlined in detail in the Judiciary Act.26
Another section of the Act provided for an attorney-general to prosecute and
conduct all suits in the Supreme Court in which the United States shall be concerned and
to give advice and opinion upon questions of law when required by the President or when
requested by the heads of any of the departments.27 The legislature shaped the courts with
an understanding that the judiciary would help in charting the path of governmental
policy.28 The legal suits and actions that could be presented in each of the courts were
spelled out clearly designating the legal jurisdiction of each court. The duties and
responsibilities of marshals, deputies, and the attorney-general were explicit.
The superiority of federal powers over those of the states was defined. Ellsworth and
Paterson resorted to obscure and legalistic jargon in section twenty-five of the Act to
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empower the Supreme Court with the power to declare unconstitutional any law enacted
by Congress or state legislatures it perceived as outside the limits of the Constitution.29
The first stage of becoming a nation was winning the war for independence, the second
stage was creating a federal government supreme over all rivals within the sphere of
power and the final stage would be the application of the weighty principals for the
nation.30
With the passage of the Judiciary Act of 1789 the work of the Congress in
establishing the federal courts was finished and the next step in establishing the courts
would be up to George Washington and those he would nominate for the high court.
Washington had the unique opportunity to select all the members of the federal judiciary.
The responsibility of choosing the five associate justices and the chief justice, he took
stoically because he believed that “the due administration of Justice was the strongest
cement of a good government.”31 Washington relied on seven criteria in choosing his
nominees for the court. First, they must support the Constitution and be an advocate for
the Nation. They must have had distinguished service in the Revolution and be an active
political participant in their state or the nation. Washington wanted each justice to have
some judicial experience along with a favorable reputation with his fellows and wanted
those he might have personal ties with. Appointees had to love their country and have
some geographic suitability for the job.32
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After careful deliberation George Washington selected John Jay as the first Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court. The time Jay would spend on the bench coincided with a
particular volatile phase of the revolutionary process, the period after formal adoption of
a contested and some thought illegal Constitution and before the citizenship would be
educated about the documents. Before taking office in 1789, Jay had argued that “due
distribution” of power required cooperation between the executive and jurists in a similar
fashion as New York‟s council of revision.33 In order to strengthen the court and the
nation Jay needed to interpret the vague language in the Constitution regarding the role
the court possessed in governing the nation. The entire judiciary system lacked
legitimacy because there was no immediate institutional antecedent for its existence.
Some sections of the Judiciary Act and the Process Acts were being closely scrutinized
by the legislature and every action the court took needed to be one that would increase its
power and authority.34
John Jay came to the court with excellent credentials. He was admitted to the bar
in New York in 1766 and served in both the First and Second Continental Congresses.
Under the Articles of Confederation he served as President and helped draft the New
York Constitution. He helped negotiate the Paris Peace Treaty ending the Revolutionary
War. While not a delegate at the Philadelphia convention he was an active participant in
the ratification process in New York. He was aware of the problems the nation had under
the Articles of Confederation and supported the new government. He believed the
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country needed a strong government of decisive federal institutions and laws “ably
administered” by a wise minority.35 For a short while in 1789 Jay served simultaneously
as Chief Justice and Secretary of State until Thomas Jefferson returned from France and
accepted Washington‟s nomination. This dualism of jobs was acceptable at the time
because of the needs and priorities of the nation.36
Other members of the first court appointed by Washington were John Rutledge,
William Cushing, James Wilson, John Blair, and Robert H. Harrison. Justice Harrison
resigned because of ill health before setting on the court. John Rutledge was a delegate
to both the First and Second Continental Congresses. In 1776 he aided in the writing of
the South Carolina Constitution and served as a delegate at the Constitutional Convention
in 1787. He proposed a more restricted federal judiciary wanting only one Supreme
Court and no lesser courts. He professed judges should never give their opinion on a law
until it came before them.37
William Cushing was the third justice appointed by Washington in 1789. His
judicial career spanned fifty years and he served in nine judicial positions. He did not
attend the Constitutional Convention but was a major factor in the ratification process in
Massachusetts. Cushing presided over most of the ratification sessions in Boston as the
Chief Justice of Massachusetts. He made a series of grand jury charges that were
designed to educate the public about the need for ratification of the new government. He
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would be a major participant in strengthening the power of the federal judiciary during
his service on the bench.38
Another appointment Washington made was James Wilson, a signer of both the
Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. Only James Madison exerted more
influence over the Constitution than did James Wilson. At the convention he was a
powerful voice for an independent judiciary. In law lectures Wilson expressed clear
expectations for the right of the judiciary to review the legality of laws instituted under
the Constitution. He believed the Supreme Court was in the position to check Congress
because the justices were trained in the complex legal matters and were insulated from
popular passions. He was a leading member of the ratification constituency in
Pennsylvania.39
John Blair from Virginia rounded out the appointment on the first court. He was a
delegate at the Constitutional convention and had served on the court in Virginia in 1779.
Under the state constitution of Virginia, Blair defended judicial review as policy
important to the separation of powers. At the time, the question of the power of judicial
review was not controversial. At the Constitutional Convention Blair advocated a strong
independent judiciary with life tenure for the justices. He backed the idea of a well
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articulated system of federal courts with admiralty jurisdiction, with power to judge cases
between citizens of different states, and with states as the defendants.40
After the resignation of Robert Harrison, George Washington selected James
Iredell from North Carolina to serve on the Supreme Court. He was not a delegate at the
Constitutional Convention but supported the new Constitution and worked for ratification
in North Carolina. North Carolina rejected the Constitution and remained independent
until after the first election before finally ratifying the Constitution in November 1789.
James Iredell at thirty-eight was one of the youngest judges to serve on the federal court.
He supported the idea that the powers of the Assembly were limited and defined by the
Constitution. To him the Constitution was the fundamental law, and unalterable by the
legislature and for that reason an act must be voided that was inconsistent with it. Iredell
believed it the responsibility of the judges to make sure every act of the Assembly they
presumed to enforce was warranted by the Constitution and not usurped discretionary
powers but only those assigned them by their constituted offices.41
The Judiciary Act of 1789 established the federal court system with specific
guidelines including the establishment of districts with each state assigned one resident
federal district judge to hear revenue and prize cases. A circuit was assigned to each
Supreme Court Justice who was responsible for presiding over two courts a year in each
state in his circuit. The act established the dates for Supreme Court sessions to
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commence and restricted jurisdiction to the court in cases where a state was the
defendant.42
These men appointed by Washington and confirmed by the Senate serving as
judges sitting on circuit court were how the American people became acquainted with the
new institution of government and the federal judiciary. Through charges given to grand
juries, the public came to understand the principles of the new Constitution and the
government it established. The justices on these early courts each wrote and delivered
orally their individual opinions on a case in what is considered Seriatim opinion writing.
Over the first decade the jurisdiction and power of the court would be expanded and
defined by judgments these justices made.43
An early incident between Congress and the Court helped to clarify the judiciary‟s
role in the new governmental structure. In 1792 there was a continuing problem
concerning pension claims by veterans of the Revolutionary War. The Secretary of War
and his department were overloaded with claims and asked the Congress for help. In
April the Congress told the federal justices that it would be their duty to hear and assess
the viability of pension claims and to forward the results to the Secretary of War where
they were subject to reversal. Justice John Blair riding circuit in Pennsylvania refused to
hear the cases judging the order unconstitutional because the separation of powers
forbade judges opinions from being subject to reversal by members of other branches of
the government. Justice Blair concluded the act was radically inconsistent with the
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independence of judicial power--so strictly observed by the Constitution. Other justices
followed his judgment and the Congress changed the procedure for assessing veteran
claims.44
Standing firmly on its belief in the separation of powers, the Supreme Court
refused a request by George Washington for advice on the neutrality laws in relation with
supplying aid to France in a conflict with England. The justices concluded their power
lay with making judgments on suits brought before them that concerned the treaty and not
in interpreting the merits of a treaty. They accepted that if the congress approved a treaty
then it was part of the law for all states and infractions could and should be judged by the
federal court.45
The first full scale constitutional law decision the court decided was in a dispute
originating over debts incurred during the Revolutionary War. In this case Chisholm, a
resident of North Carolina, brought suit against the state of Georgia in the federal court.
The judges referred to Article III, Part 2, and Section 2 of the Constitution that stated the
Supreme Court had original jurisdiction in all cases where a state was one of the parties
involved in the suit. The case presented a conflict between federal jurisdiction and state
sovereignty. The court ruled in favor of Chisholm. The decision contributed to the power
of the federal court to act as judges in cases involving non-residents suing a state
constraining the actions of individual states, thus limiting the power of states. James
Wilson concluded that a state could be sued and John Jay explained the Constitution gave
express reference to federal jurisdiction in the case. John Blair concurred with the
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Constitutional argument for hearing the case. James Iredell was the only justice to write
a negative opinion of the action. The immediate consequences of the decision was
Congress took action that lead to the enactment of the eleventh amendment, taking away
jurisdiction from the court in such cases. It was the first instance in which a Supreme
Court decision was superseded by a constitutional amendment.46
The Supreme Court during Washington‟s presidency evolved slowly and despite
continuous changes of the judges, the court early established a primary place in the
federal government. John Jay resigned from the position of Chief Justice in order to
negotiate a treaty with Great Britain. President Washington appointed John Rutledge as
Chief Justice. Rutledge had been on the court earlier and had resigned but gladly
returned as Chief Justice. His tenure as Chief Justice was short lived because the Senate
refused to confirm the appointment when it reconvened. Washington‟s final two
appointments to the Supreme Court were Oliver Ellsworth, who was appointed Chief
Justice, and Samuel Chase from Maryland. Ellsworth was a member of the original
committee to write the Judiciary Act and the person chiefly responsible for crafting the
act.47 At the Connecticut ratification convention, Ellsworth explained that the judicial
department would restrain both the Congress and the states from being able to destroy the
Constitution.
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During the first years of the court, the justices heard only a few cases, but some
were of importance to the new nation and the establishment of the federal judiciary. In
1794 Congress enacted a law entitled, “An act to lay duties upon carriages for the
conveyance of persons.” The law assessed a tax on each carriage owned by an individual
or business. The Constitution stated that Congress could not impose a law that was a
direct tax but only a law that was an apportioned tax, meaning one accessed according to
the population and the number of representatives from each state. Daniel Hylton viewed
the carriage tax as a direct tax with the case being first heard in circuit court and then by
Supreme Court Justices Samuel Chase, William Paterson, and James Iredell. The justices
unanimously agreed that the carriage tax was an indirect tax therefore legal. Justice
Chase in writing his decision interpreted the terms “tax” and “duty” in Article 1, Section
8, broadly, and concluded the carriage tax was an indirect tax. Justice Iredell argued that
because the tax could not be apportioned if a state had no carriages then it was a direct
tax “in the sense of the Constitution.” In his seriatim opinion, Samuel Chase supported
the judgment of the other justices. In the case of Hylton v. United States, the case before
the Court was had Congress violated the Constitution and gone beyond its taxing and
spending powers in implementing the tax. With their decision the Supreme Court upheld
the taxing power of Congress and in this instance interpreted the meaning of the
Constitution in a broad expansion of power.48
These early decisions of the Supreme Court not only strengthened the power of
the central government and the Constitution but also established the court‟s own
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authority. The case of Chisholm v. Georgia, concerning the possibility of a state being
sued in federal court by a non-resident, brought to the front the question of states‟ rights.
The court decided the non-resident had a right to bring a case in front of the federal court
against the state of Georgia. Even the most ardent Federalist Congressmen could not
fathom such power so soon. The Court had encroached too far on the authority of the
states, and congress voted to overturn the decision through the only legal means
available, a Constitutional Amendment ratified in 1798 preventing a private citizen from
suing a state in federal court.49
Another national crisis concerning the authority and power of both the executive
office and the Supreme Court occurred during the imposition and resistance to a federal
mandated tax on whiskey. Alexander Hamilton, Secretary of the Treasury, in order to
augment the national government‟s revenue from import duties recommended an excise
tax on domestically produced whiskey. In March 1791, the Congress complied with the
request and specified in the law that all trials concerning tax evasion were to be
conducted in a federal court. The problem began in western Pennsylvania where anyone
indicted for noncompliance was forced to travel three hundred miles to the federal court
in Philadelphia. The accused then had to face a jury of unsympathetic easterners and in
addition bear the heavy burden of the cost of the long journey and loss of wages plus
court fines and penalties if found guilty. A United States Marshal was attacked by one
hundred men while serving sixty delinquent taxpayers with summonses to appear in court
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in Philadelphia and soon more violence erupted. The chief revenue officer‟s house was
burned by a crowd of five hundred after a shootout with federal soldiers assigned to
protect him. Since Congress had closed its session after passing the new exciseenforcement law, the President, George Washington, had personal discretion to create the
largest possible force to suppress what he perceived as a rebellious faction that might
threaten the security of the nation. In order to invoke his powers under the Militia Act
Washington needed the certification of a Supreme Court Justice acknowledging that law
enforcement had truly failed in western Pennsylvania. Alexander Hamilton gathered
documentation for presentation to Justice James Wilson, who made no independent
investigation of the conditions in the west before he certified the call for troops.50
The legitimacy of calling out the militia against citizens was debated between the
state of Pennsylvania and the Washington administration. Edmund Randolph, who as a
delegate at the Constitutional Convention had argued for the creation of a strong national
government with the power to put down insurrections, now urged Washington not only to
delay action but to negotiate with the rebels. Randolph believed and rightfully so that
Judge Wilson had irresponsibly approved the operation.51 While some negotiations were
attempted, in the end the militia was needed to suppress the resistance. Some of the cases
stemming from the excise tax were heard in the federal district court but none were
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debated at the Supreme Court level. Justice Wilson by signing the order certifying the
use of force in ordering up the militia strengthened the power of the federal government
because it marked a milestone in determining limits on public opposition to federal
policies, including those of the Supreme Court, the adjudicating part of the government.
By the end of George Washington‟s second term, the nation and the Supreme
Court began to display signs of legitimacy to its citizens and the world. The powerful
presence of the justices of the Supreme Court was a good educating force by explaining
and interpreting the laws as set forth in the Constitution and those enacted by Congress.
The pattern was set for judicial review of legislation that would become prominent during
John Marshall‟s tenure as Chief Justice at the beginning of the nineteenth century. The
power of the judiciary branch expanded in its first ten years of existence to a visible
influence in the lives of the citizens of the United States by aiding in the consolidation of
power in a central government and earning for itself the respect of confidence of the
people.
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CHAPTER 5
EXPANSION OF POWER: THE MARSHALL ERA

Before George Washington announced his retirement, a division of political views
created dissension about the direction the federal government was to take and the rights
and powers of the individual states. This division, stemming from the adoption of the
Constitution, was between the Federalists, those who believed in a strong federal
government, and the Anti-federalists, who supported less federal power and more
sovereignty for the states. Adding to the discontent of the Anti-federalists was the
negotiations and confirmation of the Jay Treaty designed to eliminate recurring problems
with England left over from the Revolutionary War. It took Jay a year to negotiate a
treaty that many citizens thought unsatisfactory and only with the prestige of Washington
and the political skills of Hamilton was the treaty ratified after the entire debate and vote
were held in secret. During the controversy, which could have had unfavorable
consequences to the prestige of the Supreme Court, Jay was elected as governor of New
York and resigned his position as Chief Justice.1
By the time of the presidential election of 1796, Washington appointed Senator
Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut, a principal author of the Judiciary Act, as Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court. He also appointed Samuel Chase, chief judge of the Maryland
general court, before the election of John Adams as president of the United States and
Thomas Jefferson as vice-president.2
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Within a month after taking the oath of office, John Adams faced a possible
dilemma with France. The French looked upon Jay‟s Treaty as the forming of an AngloAmerican alliance and treated the United States with hostility and its representatives with
disdain, believing there were surely secret portions of the treaty. The French Directory
were threatening reprisals against American shipping interests and Adams, hoping to
continue Washington‟s policy of avoiding actual involvement in the war between
England and France, decided to send a three-man delegation to France. Along with
Elbridge Gerry, a Republican proponent, Adams appointed two staunch Federalists,
Charles Pinckney and John Marshall, a lawyer from Virginia. The delegation was treated
with open contempt by the brokers for the French foreign minister, Talleyrand. During
the meetings in France suggestions for the desire of money changing hands ended with
Marshall sending an account of the French diplomatic tactics, along with the names of the
extortionate intermediaries, known as X, Y, and Z, back to President Adams who
reported it to Congress.3
Rumors began to spread more rapidly of a possible French invasion and the fear
of enemy spies being present frightened many citizens. After a warning by President
Adams of the dangers of foreign influence and the need to exterminate them, the
Congress in 1798 passed a series of four laws collectively called the Alien and Sedition
Acts. The Sedition Act made it illegal for anyone to speak or to write any false,
scandalous, or malicious remarks against the president or the Congress. The Republican
minority in Congress argued to no avail that the laws violated the First Amendment
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which assured freedom of speech and freedom of the press. The act was condemned in
many states and the legislatures of Virginia and Kentucky adopted resolutions declaring
the law unconstitutional and as sovereign states they had the right to declare it
unconstitutional. In Virginia there was talk of secession. What enraged the people was
the part the judiciary particularly the Supreme Court Justices played in the enforcement
of the act. While the Supreme Court never had the occasion to judge the constitutional
merits of the act, many of the individual justices riding circuits vigorously enforced the
act; the worst offender was Justice Samuel Chase.4
Following the elections of 1800 and the pending take over of elected Republican
officials, including Thomas Jefferson as President, the Federalist Congress took steps to
secure influence in the judiciary. When James Iredell resigned from the Supreme Court
Adams appointed Bushrod Washington, a relative of George Washington, who was
confirmed by the Senate. When Chief Justice Oliver Ellsworth resigned, only a month
before Jefferson was to take office, Adams asked Jay to return to the court. Jay declined
the offer partly because he had resigned in 1795 due to the onerous duties of riding circuit
as part of the justices responsibilities under the Judiciary Act. Adams then turned to John
Marshall, the Secretary of State, who had served him well in France and was a person
who he respected and knew to be on the side of the Federalists. John Marshall‟s
nomination was rapidly confirmed by the Senate that also passed an act expanding the
Federal judiciary by adding twenty-three new judges and doubling the number of circuit
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courts, while cutting the number of Supreme Court Justices to five. The judges
nominated by Adams were good choices and were confirmed with little opposition from
the Republicans in the Senate.5
In addition to expanding the federal judiciary, the Congress on February 27 gave
Adams the authority to create as many justices of the peace for the new District of
Columbia as he saw fit. He quickly submitted for confirmation the names of forty-two
justices and the Senate pushed through the necessary confirmations. On his last night in
office, Adams signed the commissions and sent them to the State Department, where
Secretary Marshall was to affix the great Seal before dispatching the appointments. At
the time Marshall had not resigned his position as Secretary of State even though he had
been sworn in as the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. While most of the commissions
reached the appointees, those of the new District of Columbia justices of the peace went
astray. As a result of trivial slip-up, a fundamental principle of the Constitution, one that
would affect the lives of millions of future Americans, would forever be established. The
mistake of Secretary of State John Marshall would lead to Chief Justice John Marshall‟s
first, and in the opinion of some historians the greatest decision, of his thirty-four years
on the bench.6
Along with the election of Thomas Jefferson as President the Republicans won
control of the House of Representatives and the Senate. Jefferson experienced few
problems getting any initiatives or laws passed through the Congress, but the judiciary
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presented a more difficult problem. He considered proposing a constitutional amendment
that would change the principle of life tenure for the justices. Jefferson succeeded in
eliminating the second tier of the judicial system; the federal attorneys and marshals, thus
giving Republicans full control of the access to the courts. Then he had the Judiciary Act
of 1801 repealed placing the principle of lifetime appointments in jeopardy. In order to
insure time to enact the repeal, the Republican Congress postponed the next session of
the Supreme Court for a year. It was evident that Jefferson wished to revoke judicial
appointment amendable to party politics.7
Some of the justices deposed by Jefferson‟s actions petitioned Congress for
“relief,” but were rejected. The Supreme Court had to meet in the office of the Clerk of
the Senate because no one had designed a place for the court to meet. At every
opportunity Marshall struck against the power and authority of the new President, his
cousin. However, there were few occasions for him to do so. On one occasion Marshall
refused to allow a Presidential message to be read into the record, stating that it would
violate the principle of separation of powers by bringing the President into the court. In
another action Marshall ruled Jefferson‟s action in a boat seizure incident was illegal.
Marshall was ready to declare the Judicial Repeal Act unconstitutional, but none of the
deposed circuit court judges brought a case to court. Marshall attempted to persuade his
associates that it was unconstitutional for Supreme Court Justices to ride circuit as they
must do again since the lower courts had been abolished by Jefferson. Although agreeing
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with his reasoning the other justices would not support him because they felt the years of
having ridden the circuit lent sanction to the old law. Frustrated, Marshall waited for any
opportunity to judge the actions of Jefferson.8
When in December 1801 the case of Marbury v. Madison came before the court;
chief Justice Marshall had the chance to confront the judicial actions of President
Jefferson. William Marbury was one of the justices of the peace for the District of
Columbia whose commission Jefferson had held up. Marbury was petitioning the court
to issue an order, a writ of mandamus, requiring Secretary of State James Madison to
deliver his commission. Marshall assumed jurisdiction for the Supreme Court to hear the
case and issued an order for Madison to show cause at the next term of the court why
such a writ should not be drawn up. Marshall considered this his opportunity to assert the
authority of the Court over the executive branch of government. In a bid to secure more
time, Madison convinced the Congress to suspend the summer session of the Court and
make the next session convene in February, 1803. Perhaps, Marshall because of his prior
involvement in the case should have disqualified himself but he chose not to and no
objections were raised.9
When the court convened on February 9, Justices Bushrod Washington and
Samuel Chase in addition to Marshall were on the bench. The case proceeded even
though the administration boycotted the hearings. Knowing he had control over
Congress, President Jefferson waited for Marshall to act. If Marshall overreached the
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powers of the Court, he could be impeached and if he backed down the prestige of the
Court would be reduced.10
Marshall realized issuing the writ would produce little because he knew it would
be ignored by Madison who would be backed by Jefferson. It would be a futile act to
issue the writ and might instigate impeachment proceedings against Marshall. Marshall
engineered a solution to the dilemma and although it was based on questionable legal
logic it convinced the associate justices to agree to it. The issue as Marshall perceived it
was a conflict between the Court and the President and the problem was how to check the
President without hurting the Court. The solution Marshall suggested was to state
emphatically the justice of the plaintiff‟s case and to condemn the actions of the
Executive but to deny that the Court had the power to provide judgment in the case.
Marshall said the justices were entitled to their commissions and that Madison by
withholding them was in violation of the law. He said the court could not issue the writ
because the provision in the Judiciary Act of 1789 authorizing the court to do so was
unconstitutional. In other words, Congress had no legal right to give the power to the
Court. Marshall claimed the writ of Mandamus could only be issued in cases that came to
it on appeal from a lower court and this case had originated in the Supreme Court.
Further he emphasized that the Constitution was the “Supreme Law of the Land” and that
it was the duty of the judicial department to say what the law was and then the Supreme
Court must overturn any law that violates the Constitution thus making the law void. The
court could not issue the writ of mandamus because the Act of 1789 ceased to exist.
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While Jefferson was angry at the criticisms aimed at him, he accepted the principles of
the decision but claimed the executive as well as the judiciary could decide questions of
constitutionality. Although it was not the first time the power of judicial review, not
discussed in the Constitution, had been used, Marshall‟s decision increased the power and
integrity of the Supreme Court to render judgment on the constitutionality of a law and
effectively limited executive powers.11
Inadvertently the attempted impeachment of Justice Samuel Chase also
strengthened the court. There is no doubt that Chase‟s conduct as a judge was improper,
but his insolence and errors in judgment did not fit the criteria of “high crimes and
misdemeanors” to be removed from office. There were thirty-four Senators at the time,
but although the Republicans had enough for the necessary two-thirds to impeach, there
were not enough who believed that Chase‟s conduct constituted high crimes or
misdemeanors. The Senate failed to find Chase guilty; therefore, he remained on the
bench until his death in 1811. The immediate consequence of the decision restored
confidence to Marshall who continued to make the Supreme Court a major instrument in
shaping the political, economic, and social patterns of the nation.12
In 1804 Jeffersonian congressmen met in caucus and nominated Jefferson for
president and George Clinton for vice president. No one at the caucus wanted Aaron
Burr. So for over a year Burr was a somewhat bitter lame duck vice president. During
this time it is possible that he was engaged in both business and political activities that
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could be considered quite questionable. Burr traveled west and south into the new
territories that were part of the Louisiana Purchase. His activities resulted in him being
charged and tried for treason in Mississippi where he was acquitted. James Wilkinson,
the governor of the Louisiana Territory, provided President Jefferson with some
dispatches as proof of a conspiracy headed by Burr to invade Spanish territory and set up
a new nation. Jefferson issued a proclamation in November 1806 for Burr‟s arrest.
Initially on April 1, Chief Justice Marshall concluded the prosecution had failed to
present enough evidence for treason but scheduled the trial of Aaron Burr on the charges
of high misdemeanors leaving it open for the prosecution to gather witnesses to produce
evidence on the treason charges. President Jefferson may have lost his objectivity with
regard to the Burr case, but his desire to win was obvious because his administration
spent nearly $100,000 and over fifty blank pardons in an attempt to convict Burr. The
prosecution conceded that Burr was not present at the supposed conspiracy meeting but
they argued that his previous involvement with members of the group implied his support
of the conspiracy. Marshall‟s opinion was the prosecution had not presented sufficient
evidence under the definition of treason in the Constitution to convict Burr. Jefferson
was furious and contemplated suggesting a Constitutional Amendment limiting the
powers of the judiciary. Marshall judged the case by the evidence and the constitutional
meaning of treason, further increasing the prestige of the court.13 Marshall‟s strict reading
of the Constitution and firm position of evidence put the American law of treason beyond
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the easy grasp of political expediency, as the Framers of the Constitution had intended. 14
During the next thirty-four years Marshall dominated the court and rendered more
than a thousand decisions, finding himself in the minority only eight times, despite the
fact that most of the Federalist justices were replaced by Jefferson and his republican
successors. Some of the decision of the court strengthened the national government at
the expense of the states and others supported the position of the country‟s property
interests. In the 1810 case Fletcher v. Peck, the court threw out a Georgia law that
rescinded large land grants. The premise in the case was a contract, once agreed upon,
could not be summarily broken. Another case in 1819 involved the clash of federal and
state authority and would have long lasting consequences. The controversy involved the
charter of Dartmouth College located in New Hampshire.15
Initially Dartmouth‟s royal charter provided that its board of trustees would be
self-perpetuating. The legislature of New Hampshire passed a law to permit the state to
appoint trustees: thus the college was changed from a private to a public college. The
Supreme Court of New Hampshire upheld the state‟s right to alter the charter and change
the status of the college. Alumnus, Daniel Webster represented his college when the
case, the Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, was heard on appeal by the
Supreme Court. Webster argued based on the interpretation of the full meaning of the
clause in the Constitution prohibiting states from impairing the obligations of contracts.
Present in the court room were a large number of representatives from other colleges
14
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whose independence would also be in question if the court decided in favor of New
Hampshire. Webster cited the case of Fletcher v. Peck involving land grants where the
verdict of the court had been that a grant was the same as a contract. Further Webster
argued that the Dartmouth charter was a grant or contract of corporate powers and
privileges as much as a grant of land. After other attorneys presented their arguments,
Marshall announced that some of the justices could not make up their minds; therefore,
the case was continued until the next term, postponing the decision for a year. During the
year both sides sought support and lobbied the justices. When the court reconvened in
February 1819, Marshall read his magisterial opinion. Marshall adjudicated that a grant
of corporate powers was indeed a contract within the meaning of the Constitution;
therefore, a state legislature did not have the power to void it. The case enhanced the
prestige of both John Marshall and the Supreme Court because it illustrated the power
and authority of the federal court over state courts. The charter rights of Dartmouth and
all private colleges were confirmed by the decision.16
Although the Dartmouth College case was important, it did not eliminate the
problems of state versus federal powers. Another hotly contested issue arose from the
efforts of Maryland and Ohio to drive a federal corporation, the Bank of the United
States, out of their territory. The federal bank was chartered by Congress in 1816 as part
of the American mercantile system whose job it was to aid the government in fiscal
operations and provide a national system of credit and a uniform national currency.
However instead of restraining state banks, under the Bank‟s first president it competed
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against them in speculation and extension of credit.17 Maryland passed legislation
imposing a tax on all banks not chartered by the state including the Baltimore branch of
the Bank of the United States. Because the bank refused to comply with the Maryland
order, the teller at the federal bank, James E. McCulloch, was arrested and charged. The
Baltimore County Court judged the case in favor of the state and on appeal the judgment
was affirmed by the Maryland Court of Appeals thence by writ of error it went to the
United States Supreme Court. Both parties in the case, McCulloch v. Maryland, agreed
upon the facts of the case. The only question to be decided was whether the federal law
chartering the Bank and the state law taxing it were in conflict and if so which was
constitutional and override the other.18
When the case opened in late February the Bank of the United States was
represented by Daniel Webster, a former Federalist Congressman who three years before
had opposed the bill chartering the bank, by William Pinkney of Baltimore, and by
Attorney General William Wirt. Maryland was represented by Joseph Hopkinson from
Philadelphia, Walter Jones from Washington, and Luther Martin, who had actively
opposed the Constitution at the convention in 1787. Martin had opposed ratification of
the Constitution in Maryland because of the feared subjection to federal authority now
being argued.19 Marshall, speaking for the unanimous Court, began by saying the Court
was only doing what it had to do and turned to Maryland‟s assertion of sovereignty and
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expounded the principal of national sovereignty which is supreme over state sovereignty.
Further Marshall said the incorporation of the Bank was constitutionally sound under the
provision of enumerated powers that gave Congress the power to pass laws necessary and
proper. Marshall found the tax imposed by Maryland unconstitutional.20 The decision
was upsetting to Thomas Jefferson and other orthodox Republicans because of the seven
justices only two were Federalist, the others having been appointed by
Jefferson or Madison, both of whom opposed the Bank chartering recommendation of
Alexander Hamilton.21
Another important decision, perhaps the only popular one that Marshall rendered,
was again one that would increase the powers of the federal government over those of the
states. The case centered on a fight between rival steamboat operators in New York
Harbor and concerned the single question of whether or not Congress had the power to
regulate interstate as well as foreign commerce. Both the claimant and the defense in the
case, Gibbons v. Ogden, were represented by eminent counsel because at the time the
controversy over nationalism and states‟ rights was in the forefront making the case
already famous. Once the arguments were heard it took almost a month before Marshall
delivered the Court‟s opinion. For the first time the Court had a chance to clarify the
meaning of the commerce clause and in a legal point of view the opinion Marshall wrote
was one his soundest. Only Justice William Johnson dissented. Marshall stated under the
Commerce Clause of the Constitution the monopoly statutes of the State of New York
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were invalid because the Federal Coasting License Act of 1793 superseded in authority
the state law dealing with the same subject. In short, Congress had the power to regulate
navigation within the limits of every state if such navigation was connected with foreign
or interstate trade. Marshall‟s decision, which has been called “the emancipation
proclamation of American commerce,” was far-reaching in scope and became more
important to the country as time went on in the development of the railroad, the
telegraph, the telephone, and the oil and gas pipe lines; as they moved across state
borders and depended on protection under Gibbons v. Ogden.22
While other cases were decided in Marshall‟s thirty-four years as Chief Justice
that strengthened the authority and prestige of the Supreme Court and the nation, one
arising during the presidential term of Andrew Jackson appears, at least on the surface, to
weaken the position of the Court. Jackson, elected in 1828, was a critic of the federal
judiciary, and his election in part seemed a popular questioning of the power and position
of the judiciary. While Americans revered the Constitution and to some degree the
nationalism of Marshall, Jackson perceived that the Marshall position was a threat to the
sovereignty of the individual states. In the campaign for president Marshall had sided
with Henry Clay and John Quincy Adams, thus Jackson was displeased personally with
Marshall and not just the judiciary.23
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During George Washington‟s administration, the government entered into a treaty
with the “Cherokee Nation” of Indians in Georgia giving them ownership of their land
and providing them substantial autonomy. After gold was discovered on the land Georgia
desired it and enacted legislation abrogating all the Indians‟ laws and dividing up their
lands. The Cherokees appealed to President Jackson, who had little sympathy for the
cause of any Indians. They then applied to the Supreme Court for an injunction to stop
Georgia from enforcing the statutes. While the federal case was pending, Corn Tassel, a
Cherokee, was convicted in a state court of murdering another Indian. Tassel applied to
the Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that because of the earlier
treaty the Cherokees could not be tried in a state court because they were entitled to their
own courts. Marshall issued the writ but the legislature said the federal court had no right
interfering with the state court. The state hung Corn Tassel five days later. When the
injunction suit came before the Court for hearing Georgia refused to appear. In 1831
Marshall ruled the court had no jurisdiction of the case because the Cherokees had sued
as a foreign nation and they were not such but rather a “domestic dependent nation,”
similar to a ward of the state.24
Meanwhile, Georgia passed a statute requiring all white persons in Indian
Territory to obtain a license and take an oath of allegiance to the state. Two missionaries
refused to take the oath and were arrested and sentenced to four years imprisonment.
They appealed to the Supreme Court in the case of Worcester v. Georgia and Marshall
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ruled the law unconstitutional on the ground the Georgia had no jurisdiction over the
Indians who were exclusively under the jurisdiction of the federal government.25
President Jackson reportedly said, “John Marshall has made his decision; now let him
enforce it,” when he ignored the court‟s decision. The seeming defiance of Jackson can
be explained by examining some other factors associated with his decision to do nothing.
He was in the midst of the battle over the existence of the Bank of the United States and
over nullification issues with South Carolina. In order to enforce the Court‟s decision,
Jackson realized that it would take a large military force against Georgia and it would
still be impossible to coerce Georgia to comply and the sympathies of the country would
have been on the side of Georgia and he had a re-election campaign to consider. Jackson
viewed the Indian problem as a temporary one and the nullification issue as a national
crisis in which he would need the aid of Georgia to settle.26
The nullification issue, however, did not reach the Supreme Court. President
Jackson‟s actions in the case do illustrate the respect he held for the federal judiciary. He
believed in the supremacy of the national law and if South Carolina objected to the Tariff
Acts of 1828 and 1832 the proper recourse was either a Constitutional Amendment or the
courts. He believed the South Carolina nullifications law threatened to destroy the
supremacy of the national law and that it was the duty of the President, Congress, and the
Supreme Court to defend the law.27

25

Pfeffer, 120.
Longaker, 360.
27
Longaker, 362.
26

54

Many decisions made by the Marshall court threatened to explode into legislative
changes that would possible cripple the court because of growing fears in the south and
the west over questions of states‟ rights, but Jackson did not support changes to the
federal judiciary. The few attempts tapered off after the death of Marshall and the influx
of Jackson appointees to the Supreme Court including Roger B. Taney as Chief Justice, a
man who would preside over the Court for almost thirty years in which time the Court
would face major struggles and controversies.
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CHAPTER 6
THE TANEY COURT---CIVIL WAR---RECONSTRUCTION

Despite the attempts by the Supreme Court to protect the rights of the Cherokees
in Georgia they would be manipulated and forcibly removed to reservations in the West.
In order to justify these actions, President Jackson and the federal government would sign
treaties with the Cherokees that included provisions for the exchange of their land in
Georgia for those in West. Unfortunately the process of dispossessing the Indians was an
acceptable arrangement by the vast majority of Americans at the time, while the legality
of such actions was questioned by only a few and the enforcement of law was made
impossible both by the people and President Jackson.1
Outside the courtroom, the foundations of economic nationalism that Marshall
championed were slowly disintegrating because of nullification problems, threats of
secession, and Jackson‟s states‟ rights and his war on the Bank. Marshall was concerned
with the new conditions of the nation and despairingly wondered if the constitution could
last.2 Marshal because of his age and ill-health grew despondent about the accession of
Jackson and what alterations the growth of the democratic spirit had made upon
federalism.3
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Before Marshall‟s death in 1835, President Jackson had already appointed three
Democrats to the Supreme Court. He appointed Roger Taney to replace Marshall and
made one other appointment the same year and two appointments in 1837 giving the
Democrats an easy majority on the Court. Taney, a Southerner and Roman Catholic, was
a states‟ righter dedicated to the Union and although he had been a slaveholder, he
regretted the institution of slavery and had manumitted his slaves. Taney, a lawyer and
politician, was also an aristocrat with a democratic political philosophy serving in the
Jackson administration as Attorney General and Secretary of the Treasury, where he
revealed an anti-monopolistic, state mercantilist, democratic bias that he brought to the
Court.4
The historical changes that brought the Jacksonians to power in 1828 also
required a Court able to bring the law into accord with the political and economic
currents in order to preserve constitutional union by making it relevant for the time.
While the Taney Court inherited a substantial body of decisional law it had to adjust the
old law without appearing to abandon it in order to maintain its own prestige and the
continued authority of the law. The Taney Court faced problems created because of the
rapid expansion of the country both geographically and economically.5
While one of Marshall‟s major objectives, safeguarding property rights, was at the
time important to the economic growth of the new nation, some of his decisions now
threatened to slow up progress by hindering the development of new enterprises needed

4
5

Newmyer, 94.
Pfeffer, 121.

57

for the massive expansion of the West. Marshall‟s broad interpretations of the
Constitution were altered by the first constitutional law opinion concerning impairmentof-contract provisions written by Chief Justice Taney. The alteration of opinions
occurred in the case, Charles River Bridge v. Warren River Bridge, which was first
argued in 1831. No decision was handed down because there was no clear majority on
the Court and Marshall was concerned about issuing decisions that invalidated a state law
without a majority concurring. The Court directed counsel to reargue the case, but the
inability to obtain a majority and changes on the Court caused further postponements
until it was six years before it was presented to the Taney Court for a decision.6
The facts of the Charles River case raised crucial issues and the Court‟s decision
would modify doctrines inherited from the Marshall Court. The Massachusetts
legislature had in 1785 chartered the Charles River Bridge Company to build a bridge
connecting Boston and Cambridge over the Charles River. They granted the company the
right to collect tolls for forty years and later changed it to seventy years. While the toll
rights were still in place, the legislature chartered the Warren Bridge Company giving it
the authority to build an adjacent toll-free bridge. The legal question was did the
imprecise wording of the old charter implicitly give the Charles River Bridge Company a
monopoly that the new bridge encroached upon, thus violating the contract clause of the
Constitution? Major political, economic, and intellectual issues that divided the Whigs
and the Jacksonians hinged on the Court‟s decision. The counsel for the Charles
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River Bridge Company, Daniel Webster, argued that the Dartmouth College decision
meant that the charter the company had been granted was a contract whose obligations
could not constitutionally be impaired. Since the company had been given the
opportunity to make money by operating the bridge if, another bridge was allowed the
company would lose money and the contract would be worthless, and to permit this to
happen would destroy the security of all property and all rights derived under it.7 The
lawyer for the new bridge argued it was serving public needs produced by new
circumstances and suggested that new modes of transportation like the railroads would
have a problem if every dilapidated turnpike and canal company could continue behind
an implied monopoly.8
The Chief Justice spoke for the majority and used Anglo-American law and
Jacksonian politics and economics against the doctrine of implied contracts. Taney
declared it was a rule of common law known in every case without exception and
supported by fifty years of American usage and practice that any ambiguity in the terms
of a contract acts against the company and in favor of the public. While the rights of
private property must be guarded, Taney continued the rights of the community must be
observed. Implied monopolies he said hindered equality of opportunity and economic
progress. He concluded the charter for the new bridge was constitutional.9
In addition to expressing opposition to monopolies and refusing to allow then to
be created by judicial interpretation of a legislative grant not specifically doing so, Taney
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spelled out a concept known as police power. Under this power, government could
adversely affect private rights and interests that would normally be protected. Taney
altered the prime purpose of government making it no longer the protector of private
property and the promoter of profit-making but rather the promoter of the welfare of the
community. The Court‟s decision in favor of the free bridge over the private bridge
became one of the constitutional foundations for social welfare legislation in the
twentieth century. Taney believed his decision was necessary for economic expansion
and progress.10
Extended over from the Marshall Court was another case, City of New York v.
Miln, that concerned a New York statute requiring the master of every vessel entering the
port of New York City from an outside port to turn over to the mayor the name, previous
residence, age, and occupation of every passenger. The development of the West
required manpower that was being supplied by immigrants from Europe who often had
spent their money on passage, and a substantial number were destitute and stranded in the
city. The law had been passed in an effort to regulate and control the financial burden on
the state of New York. The master of a ship, Miln, refused to comply; therefore, he was
charged and convicted with a penalty specified for noncompliance. When it was argued
in front of the Marshall Court, he had indicated his opinion that the law was
unconstitutional. The argument of the Taney Court given by Justice Barbour upheld the
statute saying the state not only had the right, but the duty, to provide for the general
welfare by any means necessary. This police power, Barbour contended, was never
turned over to the federal
10
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government and therefore the authority of the state is complete, unqualified, and
exclusive. The Marshall Court understood the police power narrowly, referring to the
power of the states to preserve order within their borders. Under Taney the idea was
broadened to include the power to provide for the welfare of the community and accorded
a high constitutional status. It assumed the interests of the community were superior to
the rights of individuals.11
Another example of the shift away from Marshall‟s nationalist outlook is the
decision in the case Briscoe v. Bank of the Commonwealth of Kentucky concerning
banking and the issuance of “bills of credit.” Article 1, Section 10 of the Constitution
prohibited states from using “bills of credit,” but the meaning of “bills of credit” had
remained unclear. The Marshall Court in the case Craig v. Missouri had found the state
interest-bearing loan certificates were invalid because the Constitution prohibited them.
However, the Taney Court upheld the issuance of circulating notes by a state-chartered
bank, narrowly defining a “bill of credit” as a note issued by the state, on the faith of the
state and designed to circulate like money. Since the bank redeemed the notes and not the
state they were not “bills of credit” for constitutional purposes. The Court‟s decision
supporting state banking, deferred to economic realities, broadening economic
opportunity, and indulged a preference for state over national mercantilism. By this time
President Jackson had made sure that state banks constituted the main source of national
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currency and credit by closing the Nicholas Biddle Bank. The reversal from the Marshall
decision upset Justice Story, a Marshall supporter, and he dissented in the case.12
In a large part thanks to the Marshall Court, the most effective constitutional
instrument for separating power between the states and the national government was the
commerce clause of the Constitution; however, the Taney Court interpreted it differently
than had Marshall. Unlike Marshall, who believed the commerce clause operated to
impose restrictions upon state authority that was the Court‟s duty to define and enforce,
Taney professed that the mere grant of commerce power did not limit state power and the
Court‟s duty was to interfere only if a state statute if it conflicted with an act of Congress
or the Constitution. Taney did not find in the commerce clause an implied prohibition
against state taxation discriminating against foreign or interstate commerce because the
limits of state power were not expressly stated in the Constitution.
Further Taney while not denying the transporting of people was part of commerce also
professed that the “intercourse of persons passing from one state to another” was not
necessarily within the boundary of interstate commerce.13 Neither Southern nor Northern
states were likely to tolerate interpretations of the commerce clause that would limit their
prerogatives. The South because of slavery and the North because of an interest in
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reform legislation including anti-slavery laws needed limited use of the commerce clause
and federal intervention.14
In the first years of the American republic, slavery was not a serious national
problem because provisions to stop the import of slaves after twenty years was included
in the Constitution along with a protection for slave owners against the emancipation of
runaway slaves in non-slave states. The industrial revolution changed the nature of the
country in many ways including views of the slavery issue. The admission of new states
into the Union created discussions and laws affecting the spread of slavery westward.
The slavery issue was bound to come before the court because it was basic to the political
and economic life of the nation.15
The first significant case the Taney Court decided that dealt directly with the
slavery issue was Groves v. Slaughter in 1841. The overexpansion of the slave trade and
the draining of capital placed Mississippi in financial trouble; thus a constitutional
amendment was adopted prohibiting the further importation of slaves as merchandise into
Mississippi but did not enact legislation enforcing the prohibition. A purchaser defaulted
on payment for imported slaves, and the seller argued the state prohibition was void
because it conflicted with federal commerce power. A Court majority of four were able to
evade the issue of whether slaves were persons or articles of commerce in holding that
the Mississippi constitutional provision was ineffectual in the absence of statutory
supplement. Although concurring with the decision, both Chief Justice Taney and
Associate Justice Baldwin insisted that state control over slavery and African-Americans
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was exclusive of federal power. These conclusions illustrate the growing discord over
the slavery question in the nation.16
Another slavery case decided by the court in 1841 was United States v. The
Schooner Amistad, involving a Spanish owned vessel engaged in the slave trade. The
slaves mutinied and took over the vessel which ended up in Hartford, Connecticut.
Acting through the Spanish embassy, the traders demanded the return of the slaves under
an existing treaty. The district judge ruled the slaves should be shipped back to Africa
and the decision was appealed to the Supreme Court where former President John Quincy
Adams defended the Africans. The decision avoided the constitutional question
presented by the Connecticut law abolishing slavery but rather said the treaty with Spain
was not applicable because the Africans were not pirates or robbers in which case they
would have been returned to Spain. Since Spain had abolished slavery they were not
merchandise and therefore their kidnapping in Africa was unlawful, thus they were
entitled to their freedom in Connecticut. In making their decision the justices not only
interpreted American laws but also took it on themselves to interpret Spanish law and the
wording and meaning of the treaty between the United States and Spain, thus clearly
extending their authority.17
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A year later, another case, Prigg v. Pennsylvania, forced the Court to face the
problem of the fugitive slave law. Edward Prigg, a professional slave-catcher, had been
sent to Pennsylvania to recover an alleged slave, Margaret Morgan. Prigg applied for
removal certificates under the Federal Fugitive Slave Law of 1793 and Pennsylvania‟s
1826 personal liberty law, but they were denied. Without authorization, Prigg took
Morgan and her children, including one conceived and born in Pennsylvania, back to
Maryland. Pennsylvania indicted Prigg for kidnapping under the 1826 state law and after
negotiations he was returned to Pennsylvania to stand trial where he was found guilty.
The case then went to the Supreme Court so that it might define the power of states to
legislate concerning the return of fugitive slaves since Prigg believed the Pennsylvania
law was unconstitutional. While all the justices agreed the law was unconstitutional their
reasons for the decision were different. Justice Story, speaking for the Court, held that
the federal Fugitive Slave Law of 1793 was constitutional and that the Pennsylvania law
was unconstitutional because it added conditions to the return process and that as long as
no breach of peace was involved a slave owner or his agent could recapture and return a
slave to its rightful place. Story concluded his opinion by saying that all state judges and
other officials ought to enforce the federal law but the national government could not
force them to do so because it had not power to require state officials to act. Taney
concurred but objected to the assertion that northern states could withdraw their support
of the law and leave enforcement strictly to the federal government.18
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The case, Dred Scott v. John F. A. Sandford, decided by the Court in 1857, stands
as one of the most important cases heard concerning American constitutional law and it
provided a basis for far-reaching interpretations of due process and played a major role in
precipitating the Civil War.19 The case, more commonly known as the Dred Scott Case,
had been in the courts for eleven years before reaching the Supreme Court. Dr. John
Emerson, a physician attached to the United States Army stationed in the slave state of
Missouri, purchased a slave, Dred Scott, in 1833. In 1834 Emerson was transferred to the
free state of Illinois and then to the Wisconsin Territory, where slavery was forbidden by
the Missouri Compromise of 1820, and in each case he took Scott with him. Emerson
returned to Missouri with Scott and his wife and two children in 1838. In 1842, Dr.
Emerson was ordered to Florida where the Seminole War was being fought and left the
slaves behind with his wife. Shortly after returning, in 1843, Dr. Emerson died and the
slaves continued to work for Mrs. Emerson, who occasionally hired them out to others. In
1846 Scott sued Mrs. Emerson in the Missouri courts on the ground that his residence in
a free state and in a free territory had emancipated him. The Missouri Supreme Court
ruled that his return to Missouri reestablished his slave status even if suspended during
his absence.20
The case went to the Supreme Court by a writ of error and was first argued in
February 1856 with the final decision not reached until March 6, 1857. In nine separate
opinions, two dissenting, covering 234 pages, the justices attempted to solve judicially a
problem that political institutions had not been able to decide. Chief Justice Taney first

19
20

Hall, 759.
Pfeffer, 150.

66

established the Court‟s technical right and duty to consider all aspects of the case and
then turned to the question of citizenship for the first time in the Court‟s history. Taney
declared although blacks could be citizens of a given state, they were not citizens of the
United States; therefore, the Court had no jurisdiction in the case. Secondly, Taney
judged that Scott was still a slave because he had never been freed in the first place
because Congress exceeded its authority when it forbade or abolished slavery in the
territories because no such power could be inferred from the Constitution. Furthermore,
Taney declared slaves were property protected by the Constitution and the Missouri
Compromise was invalid. The chaos of the separate opinions and the Court‟s uncertainty
about the legal questions before it obscure how much of the opinion was law. Six judges
denied that Congress had the power to prohibit slavery in the territories but only three of
them thought the question was fairly before the Court. Taney‟s opinion on the question of
African-American citizenship had the support of only three justices, but the only thing
that was clear was Scott remained a slave and therefore was not a citizen and that the
Court had no jurisdiction.21
When the Court‟s decision was announced, the northern press denounced the
decision and condemned the Court, as did members of the clergy. With the Court‟s
intrusion into the slavery issue, many were sure that any compromise over slavery was
impossible. The decision damaged the machinery of political compromise as much as it
undermined the prestige of the Court. The Republican Party was forced to denounce the
Court, thereby strengthening abolitionists‟ sentiment with the party and the Democratic
Party depended on the acceptance of popular sovereignty by factions in its ranks. The
21
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decision would affect the Presidential election of 1860 and it would take the Civil War
and two amendments, the thirteenth and fourteenth, to overturn it.22
The election of 1860 resulted in a decisive majority in the Electoral College for
Abraham Lincoln. In December South Carolina seceded from the Union and was soon
followed by six other southern states. President Buchanan, in office until March 4, 1861,
was cautious and ineffective stating the states had no right to secede but added that the
federal government had no right to use force against secession. He urged compromise
but took no action to preserve the Union. In his Inaugural Address, Lincoln pledged not
to interfere with slavery in the states where it existed and he promised to enforce federal
regulation, including the Fugitive Slave Law. He labeled secession as illegal and pledged
to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution. The Civil War began when federal
troops at Fort Sumter, South Carolina were bombarded by Southern guns.
After the war broke out, Chief Justice Taney came into a direct clash with
President Lincoln, who had authorized the suspension of habeas corpus; a person‟s right
to have a judge determine the legality of his imprisonment under certain circumstances.
Lincoln authorized the military to arrest and indefinitely detain anyone suspected of
aiding the rebels. Maryland did not secede from the Union, but as a border state it had
many people sympathetic to the southern cause. In May of 1861, John Merryman, a
citizen of Baltimore was arrested and imprisoned without trial or formal charges. Taney
issued a writ of habeas corpus directing the fort‟s commander, General Cadwalader, to
bring Merryman to the Baltimore federal court. The general refused on the grounds that
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Lincoln had suspended the right to habeas corpus. Taney attempted to have Cadwalader
arrested but failed. Taney filed an opinion, Ex parte Merryman, in which he held that
under the Constitution, Congress alone, and not the President, had the power to suspend
the right of habeas corpus. One reason for the Revolutionary War, Taney stated was the
abuse by the English King in suspending the right of Habeas Corpus. Lincoln‟s
Attorney-General advised him that Taney was wrong and that the President had the right
to suspend habeas corpus; therefore, Lincoln continued the action going so far as to issue
and arrest warrant for Taney. However, no marshal could be found to arrest the eightyfour year old judge.23
During the remaining three years of his life, Taney waged his own private war
against the Union. He dissented in the Prize cases that held (by a five to four vote) that
Lincoln had the constitutional power to impose a blockade on the South. Although the
cases were not before the Court, Taney wrote a number of opinions to have ready
including one that would have declared the conscription act unconstitutional. Another
dealt with the Emancipation Proclamation and the Legal Tender Act Taney would have
declared unconstitutional. However, the Legal Tender Act did come before the Court in
1863, but Taney was too ill to attend the Court session and the other justices decided that
the Court had no jurisdiction. Chief Justice Roger Taney died in 1864. The injury done
throughout his tenure as Chief Justice to the integrity of the Supreme Court and its
relationship to the other branches of government would take many years to repair.24
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By 1864, President Lincoln had already appointed four justices to the Supreme
Court. Lincoln appointed Salmon P. Chase, who had no previous judicial experience and
had not practiced law for fifteen years, as Chief Justice. Lincoln chose Chase because he
wanted to make sure that the emancipation and legal tender measures would be upheld by
the Court, and he also wanted to end Chase‟s presidential aspirations. Lincoln believed
the Legal Tender Act, authorized by Chase when he was Secretary of the Treasury, was
secure with his court appointee.25 Lincoln knew that Chase was still a powerful leader of
the radical wing of the Republican Party and hoped the appointment would consolidate
the party. Chase as Secretary of the Treasury had faced the daunting task of financing the
war efforts and maintaining the nation‟s solvency.26
During the Civil War Lincoln authorized the creation of military commissions to
try persons accused of aiding the enemy, violating the rules of war or engaging in other
disloyal activities. In late 1864, United States army officials in Indiana arrested Lambkin
Milligan and several other prominent antiwar Democrats. They were charged with
conspiracy to seize munitions at federal arsenals and to free Confederate prisoners held in
several northern prison camps. At the time Indiana was not in the area of military
operations and the defendants could have been tried in a federal court for treason, but
army officials elected to try the defendants by military commission because they doubted
the reliability of Indiana courts and juries. The military tribunal found Milligan and two
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other defendants guilty and sentenced them to death by hanging. Milligan challenged the
conviction in the United States Circuit Court in Indiana and the disagreement of two
judges sent the case to the Supreme Court. Even though the Court announced its decision
in April 1866, the opinions were not released until December. All nine justices agreed
that the military court did not have jurisdiction and that Milligan and the others must be
released. The grounds for the decision, however, were quite different. Justice Davis,
writing for the Court, stated that the Constitution was not suspended in time of
emergency or war; therefore, the military trial of civilians violated the Constitution.
Chase agreed that Milligan should be released but rested his decision on the Habeas
Corpus Act of 1863 guaranteeing trial of civilians in civil courts but argued that Congress
could enact legislation to try civilians in a military court. With growing violence in the
South against African-Americans many believed that the military courts were essential to
the safety of former slaves. President Johnson would use the decision to reduce military
authority in occupied states.27
During Reconstruction the Court handed down two other controversial decisions.
In Cummings v. Missouri the Court held a Missouri statute invalid that barred any person
not first taken an oath that he had not supported or favored the Confederacy from voting,
holding office, teaching, preaching, or practicing law. The Court invalidated a federal
statute requiring a similar oath of any attorney seeking to practice in a federal court in the
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case Ex parte Garland. The grounds for both were they were retroactively imposed
punishments on something that was not punishable when committed.

28

The case of Texas v. White addressed the questions of secession, Reconstruction,
and the nature of the Union. The presidentially reconstructed government of Texas filed
suit to recover state-owned securities sold by the state‟s Confederate government. The
defendants argued that Texas had seceded from the Union and had not yet been restored;
therefore, it could not sue in federal court. Chief Justice Chase in a majority opinion
stated that Texas and all other states that had seceded had no legal right to do so;
therefore, they had been and still were a part of the Union and their citizens were still
citizens of the United States. Congress had recognized the provisional government of
Texas; therefore, they were entitled to sue in federal court. Chase ruled that the states‟
Confederate government had been illegal; its acts in support of the rebellion were null
and void. He concluded that the state was entitled to recover the securities. The decision
further endorsed the position that the Union was perpetual and that Reconstruction was a
political problem within the scope of congressional power.29
In 1866 the Fourteenth Amendment was proposed in Congress and ratified by the
States in 1868. The amendment made all people born within the nation citizens of both
the United States and the state where they were born. It further prohibited states from
depriving anyone of due process of law or equal protection under the law and reduced the
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representation of any state that deprived a part of its male population the right to vote.
The first major interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment by the Supreme Court came
in the Slaughterhouse Cases, in which the Court held that the basic civil rights and
liberties of citizens remained under the control of state law. The Court limited the
privileges of citizens referred to in the amendment to protection on the high seas and the
right to travel to and from the nation‟s capital. The decision in the Slaughterhouse Cases
drastically reduced the protection against state violations of fundamental guarantees of
liberty.30
On the death of Chief Justice Salmon Chase in 1873, President Grant at first
looked among his unscrupulous political cronies for someone to nominate before he
decided on Morrison Remick Waite, who had successfully arbitrated an award of $15
million in damages for America at the Geneva Arbitration Tribunal.31 Waite had never
argued a case before the Supreme Court when he was appointed to the position of Chief
Justice. Waite‟s decision in 1879 in the Sinking-Fund Cases was nationalistic in that it
allowed Congress to amend corporate charters in the public interest. In another case,
Minor v. Happersett, the held that denying votes to women was not a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment because suffrage was not a right of “citizenship.” Two opinions,
United States v. Cruikshank and United States v. Reese, Waite wrote narrowed national
protection of the newly freed slaves. In the case Munn v. Illinois the argument concerned
the Fourteenth Amendment‟s “Due Process Clause,” intended to bar any state from
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depriving persons of property without the process of law and the commerce power of the
Congress. The case stemmed from Illinois legislation setting the rates that grain elevator
operators in Illinois could charge their grain producing customers, providing they did
business in an Illinois city with a population larger than 100,000. The law only applied to
Chicago where farmers were upset about the elevator operators fixing rates and gouging
farmers. The operators argued the Illinois statute was an unconstitutional infringement on
their rights as guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment. Chief Justice Waite for the
majority upheld the Illinois law, arguing it was within the limits of the police power of
the state of Illinois. Justice Field dissented and argued against legislative price fixing. 32
On the death of Chief Justice Waite in 1888, President Grover Cleveland in the
hopes of bettering the Democrats‟ changes in the November election decided to appoint
someone from Illinois to the Supreme Court. The man he chose, Melville Weston Fuller,
was a well respected lawyer who had appeared regularly before the Supreme Court. In
1896 Fuller would preside over a case, Plessy v. Ferguson, which involved the Thirteenth
and Fourteenth Amendments and would change the interpretation of the Fourteenth for
the next five decades.33 The dispute arose as a test case to challenge a statute that was an
example of the Jim Crow laws then being passed in the South as whites sought to
increase their control of state governments. The Louisiana statute (1890) required
railroads to provide “equal but separate accommodations for the white and colored races”
and barred persons from occupying rail cars other those assigned to their race. Writing
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for the Court Justice Henry Billings Brown rejected both of Plessy‟s arguments stating
that the Thirteenth Amendment applied only to actions whose purpose was to reintroduce
slavery and that the law did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment requirement that all
citizens be afforded equal protection under the law. Brown postulated that laws requiring
separation of the races did not suggest that one race was inferior only if one race chose to
perceive the laws that way. Brown said that for the Court to mandate that the races be
mixed would be futile in the face of strong public sentiment as manifested by statutes
requiring separation of the races in educational facilities. Justice John Marshall Harlan
was the lone dissenter in the case holding that the law was in clear conflict with both
Amendments stating, “The arbitrary separation of citizens, on the basis of race, is a badge
of servitude inconsistent with the civil freedom and equality before the law established in
the Constitution.” The Court‟s decision in the Plessy case would stand for over fifty years
allowing segregation in every sphere of public life and would require another Supreme
Court decision to overturn the decision.34
The Supreme Court case of Pollack v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co. concerned the
federal income tax law of 1894. The Court‟s decision was given by Chief Justice Fuller
stating that the law was unconstitutional because it was not apportioned among the states
according to their populations making it a direct tax. The Court had decided in a five to
four vote after having to rehear the original issue. The Court‟s decision would stand until
the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913 providing for a federal income tax.35
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Throughout the nineteenth century the Supreme Court was involved in
controversial issues of constitutional meaning that directed the development of the nation
and the authority of the Supreme Court. The first Supreme Court Justices had the job of
educating the public to the meaning of the “Supreme Law of the Land,” and justices
throughout the century interpreted the Constitution in different ways depending upon the
needs of the nations and its citizens as the nation developed from an agrarian based
nation to an industrial nation. While the Supreme Court had far differing outlooks for the
nation as time progressed, it changed the focus of laws affecting everyone throughout the
century.
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CHAPTER 7
THE SUPREME COURT IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

At the beginning of the twentieth century the United States had returned to
economic prosperity both internally and by expanding foreign markets around the world.
The closing of the American frontier was considered as complete and the nation was
already turning to a new kind of expansionism; the gaining of territories after the Spanish
American War carried the nation into a period of stark imperialism and colonialism. The
expansion of industrial empires in the form of trusts and monopolies continued to expand,
as did labor unions and other social reforms groups, spreading into the first decades of the
twentieth century. The United States experienced a tremendous influx of immigrants
from southern and eastern Europe changing the structure of urban living. Before the end
of the century the United States would participate in two world wars along with other
military conflicts. Legislation and court decisions from the nineteenth century would be
both strengthened and totally altered as the changing nation experienced events that
would need a Supreme Court capable of interpreting the Constitution for a changing
citizenship, nation, and world. In the twentieth century the Supreme Court would
continually reflect the needs of a changing nation while maintaining its position as the
strongest branch of the government. As Alexis de Tocqueville said in the nineteenth
century the Supreme Court was given a higher standard than any other tribunal and that
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no other nation ever constituted so powerful a judiciary as the Americans and that at
some point every law that is slightly controversial will at some point be heard by the
Supreme Court.36
While the Sherman Anti-Trust Law, declaring monopolies and trusts illegal, had
been passed by Congress in 1890, it would not be until after the turn of the century when
many cases concerning trusts would be brought before the courts. The Supreme Court in
1895 had taken the position that the federal government only held authority when the act
could be enforced in respect to interstate commerce, not when a manufacturing process is
done locally for then it is under the authority of state legislatures. The decision reflected
a narrow reading of the commerce clause and the interpretation of what products might
be involved and severely limited control over the growing monopolies and trusts.37
As a result of the Court‟s decision in 1895, industrialists continued to consolidate
money and power in the formation of more monopolies and trusts; such as, the Standard
Oil Company, the Copper Trust, the Smelters‟ Trust, the National Sugar Refining
Company, and the United States Steel Corporation with a capital of more than a billion
dollars.38 Before the election of Theodore Roosevelt as President, the Department of
Justice did little to enforce the anti-trust laws taking the position that the act was aimed at
unreasonable restraints on trade and against monopolies that were against the public
interest. Roosevelt was adamant in controlling the spread of monopolies and worked
tirelessly in his attempts to destroy them.
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The case of Northern Securities v. United States, involved the formation of a
holding company to merge control of the Northern Pacific and Great Northern Railroads
created by J.P. Morgan and James J. Hill. Roosevelt instructed the Department of Justice
to bring a suit to dissolve the merger on the ground it was in violation of the Sherman Act
because the combination would restrain trade. The federal circuit court in Minnesota
issued an injunction and the company appealed to the Supreme Court. In addition to the
obvious question concerning the legality of the monopoly the question arose whether the
statute was to be applied to stock ownership. In a 5 to 4 decision the Court upheld the
injunction pronounced that the formation of the holding company was an unreasonable
restraint on trade therefore making it illegal. The dissenters in the case agreed that the
restraint was reasonable and that congressional control over commerce could not embrace
stock ownership.39
The government moved against the Standard Oil Company and American
Tobacco Company in 1910. While the Court was in full agreement to dissolve the
Standard Oil Company, they were divided on the appropriate approach to understanding
the statute. Chief Justice Edward White speaking for the Court applied “the rule of
reason” as set forth in common law and statutory construction to define restraints of trade
and monopoly, concluding that a common-law standard of reasonableness should be used
to identify the actions that the act prohibited. The wording used by White, in the opinion
of several of the Justices, was a linguistic slight of hand because the definition of reason
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itself remains ambiguous.40 Although concurring in the decision, Justice John Marshall
Harlan accused the court of having usurped the Constitutional functions of the legislative
branch of the government and accused the Court of acting outside the limits of the
Constitution.41 The Supreme Court in accepting the concept of the rule of reason adopted
a similar distinction as the one used by President Roosevelt in separating “good” and
“bad” trusts. In the words of former Chief Justice John Marshall the Court also retained
for itself, the right “to say what the law is.”42 The Court upheld the dissolution of the
American Tobacco Company later in the same year. The debate over anti-trust policies
continued throughout the presidential campaign of 1912, leading to the Clayton Antitrust
Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act.43
The progressive movement that dominated in Roosevelt‟s administration
witnessed the enactment of laws in many states hoping to ease the burdens of the working
class, including working conditions and the number of hours. The nation was adjusting
to the rapid growth of industry and to the enormous need for labor. It was inevitably that
the Supreme Court would have to interpret the Constitution that was drafted in a preindustrial age to fit the new economic developments. In 1903, Oregon passed a law
setting a maximum of ten hours work a day for women employed in factories and
laundries. A foreman of a laundry in Portland, Oregon required Mrs. Elmer Gotcher, a
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laundress, to work more than ten hours in one day. He was charged, convicted, and fined
ten dollars in a local court. After appeals at the lower court level had the same result the
case, Muller v. Oregon, went to the Supreme in 1908. With the permission of the
Oregon‟s state attorney, the National Consumers‟ League hired Louis D. Brandeis, who
later would be appointed to the Supreme Court, to defend the law. In previous cases the
Court had upheld the power of the states to guard the health, safety, and welfare of its
citizens through the police power assigned each state. Brandeis employed an innovative
strategy that involved the use of data collected supporting the assertion that long hours
had a detrimental effect on women. He included at least fifteen pages of excerpts from
other state and foreign laws to support the belief that long hours endangered women‟s
health. The new system Brandeis used is called Ex facto jus oritur meaning out of the
facts springs the law. Before this the constitutionality of such statutes limiting working
hours had been argued on their legal merits alone. The amount of economical and
sociological material that Brandeis used in his presentation became known as the
“Brandeis brief.” The Court‟s decision, while upholding the legality of the law, also
stated that working long hours took a toll on women and because healthy mothers
produce healthy offspring, the health of women becomes an object of public interest and
care and since they were inferior to men, they warranted state protection.44
In 1917, the Court heard another case, this time without Brandeis, concerning the
same Oregon statute with the Court deciding the same way. The tactics of Brandeis did
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not convince the Court in 1923 when it considered a District of Columbia law designed to
regulate the minimum wage for women. In this case, Justice Sutherland spoke for the
majority of six found that the freedom of contract clause had been violated by restraint.
Sutherland considered the brief of facts, similar to Brandeis‟, presented by Professor
Frankfurter wholly irrelevant to the case.45 While the Supreme Court heard other cases,
there is no clear conclusion from a consensus of the results. The Congress eventually
passed legislation controlling wages and working conditions for workers.
During the first decade of the twentieth century large number of immigrants from
southern and Eastern Europe entered the United States as the need for labor continued to
grow. A clause in the law stated that entry could be denied to anyone likely to become a
public charge because of the burden impoverished immigrants were becoming to many
cities on the east coast of the United States. A man, one of a group of twenty Russian
immigrants entering the United States, was denied entry. The reason given for the denial
was that the man was going to Portland, Oregon and the entry official deemed it
impossible for the man to find work there. The law was meant to excluded paupers and
professional beggars. The Supreme Court rendered a decision stating that the man could
not be denied entry simple because he was going to a particular location when in fact he
was being admitted to the nation, making it an arbitrary distinction that could not be
applied.46 The United States by the 1920s began to restrict immigrations into the United
States and during World War II most Japanese American citizens were placed in
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interment camps. While the legality of these actions was not questioned, the Supreme
Court has not been called on to rule on the Constitutionality of these actions.47
Responding to public pressure over events in Cuba, President McKinley in 1898
led the United States into war with Spain. The Spanish-American War marked the
emergence of the United States as a world power with colonial possessions in the
Caribbean and the Pacific. Even though the government had vowed the sole purpose of
the war was to liberate the oppressed Cubans, Puerto Ricans, and later the Filipinos from
their Spanish tyrants it did not end that way. Neither the Declaration of Independence
nor the Constitution with its provisions for citizenship and franchise contained any
guidelines for a colonial power. It was fine for Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines to
become part of the United States, but they produced great quantities of sugar and the
Constitution forbids any tariff on goods shipped from part of the United States to another,
this would mean that Cuban and Puerto Rican sugar must be admitted duty free, which
would upset the sugar trusts. The Constitution guarantees freedom of speech and trial by
jury and forbids cruel and unusual punishment. The Supreme Court would have to answer
the questions concerning the rights of the citizens in the annexed territories in
relationship to the rights guaranteed by the Constitution.48
The Insular Cases are a group of fourteen decisions that involve the application of
the Constitution and the Bill of Rights to overseas territories gained in the treaty ending
the Spanish-American War. Basically, the Supreme Court decided on three questions of
47

Roger Daniels, Coming to America: A History of Immigration and Ethnicity in American Life
(Princeton, N.J.: Perennial, 1991), 303-305.
.13 Pfeffer, 231-232.

83

constitutional law: whether the national government had the power to acquire territories
by treaties; whether certain statutes applied to the territories; and whether the Bill of
Rights applied automatically to any territory upon acquisition. In De Lima v. Bidwell the
Court confirmed that the nation had the power to acquire territory, pointing for support to
the history of acquisitions. In deciding about the placement of duties on goods shipped
from Puerto Rico to the United States, the Court relied on the wording of the Dingley
Tariff Act of 1897, which imposed tariffs on “all articles imported from a foreign
country.” Once Puerto Rico was ceded to the United States it was no longer a foreign
country; therefore, it did not necessarily apply to Puerto Rico. The Court decided there
were two categories of insular possessions; incorporated and unincorporated.
Incorporated territories, like Alaska before statehood, are deemed part of the United
States for almost all purposes except Congressional representation and Presidential
elections unincorporated territories, like Puerto Rico, had fewer rights, and Congress
could enact tariff laws on their exports. In Dorr v. United States, the decision concerned
the Fifth Amendment guarantee of criminal prosecution of felonies by a grand jury and
the Sixth a trial by jury. The Court decided that a Filipino charged with a felony was not
entitled to a trial by jury unless the Congress enacted a special law extending that right to
them.49
The case Truax v. Reich in 1915 declared unconstitutional an Arizona law
requiring employers to hire not less than eighty percent of their workers from among
American citizens. The Court‟s opinion written by Justice Hughes said that the equal
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protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applied to all persons and not merely
citizens, and it did not permit a state to deny to lawful inhabitants the right to earn a
living merely because they were not citizens.50
As an obvious subterfuge to evade the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments
some southern election laws had provisions exempting from the states‟ literacy
requirements for voters persons who either themselves or were direct lineal descendants
of persons who could vote on January 1, 1866, a date when Negroes were not eligible to
vote. These provisions in the election laws were called “grandfather clauses.” In the
case of Guinn v. United States the Supreme Court declared the law unconstitutional.51
Franklin D. Roosevelt took office as President at the depth of the depression and
to meet the emergency he called a special session of Congress. When the Congress
adjourned it had enacted more important pieces of legislation and instituted more new
policies than any previous legislature in American history. The Congress enacted the
Emergency Banking Law that confirmed the President‟s action in closing all the banks in
the country and gave him further emergency power to control foreign exchange, good
currency movements, and banking in general. The Congress authorized the creation of the
Federal Emergency Relief Administration, the Home Owners Loan Corporation, The
Tennessee Valley Authority, and adopted The National Recovery Act, the Civilian
Conservation Corps, and The Emergency Farm Mortgage Act.52
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The oil industry was suffering from overproduction and wasteful competition and
the oil prices had collapsed during the depression. The individual states were unable to
raise prices by controlling production so some state governors asked Congress for help.
The National Industrial Recovery Act authorized codes of fair competition, and one was
adopted for the oil industry that fixed production quotas for various states, but left it up to
each state to allocate the quotas among its own producers. Another section of the act
authorized Roosevelt to prohibit the movement in interstate commerce any oil produced
in excess of the quotas and impose a fine on guilty parties. The case, Panama Refining
Co. v. Ryan, was presented to the Supreme Court in 1934 and decided in 1935; it would
be the first setback for the New Deal Programs. The Court held the later provision
unconstitutional because the Congress could not delegate to the President the undefined
and unlimited power to create a crime by Presidential Proclamation that “hot oil” should
not be transported across state line. Shortly after this decision, the Court in another case
declared unconstitutional on the same grounds another provision of the NRA, concerning
industry codes of fair competition. The following year legislation regulating prices and
labor relations in the bituminous coal industry was ruled unconstitutional on the same
grounds. The Panama and Schechter decisions have never been overruled.53
Congress adopted the Railroad Retirement Act in 1934, providing a pension for
the retirement of railroad employees. It was to be done by a compulsory insurance
whereby contributions of the railroads and their employees were pooled to provide an
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annuity to all employees, varying according to the length of service. The Supreme Court
threw out the entire act because it was beyond the power of Congress to set up a
compulsory pension system for the railroads. This did not constitute the regulation of
commerce the Court proclaimed. Justice Roberts in giving the opinion said the act was
disguised as a measure to regulate railroad transportation, its provisions are really and
essentially related solely to the social welfare of the worker a field not for Congress.54
After his overwhelming reelection in 1936, Roosevelt believed that he had to do
something about the Supreme Court to make it more amenable to the New Deal
legislation. At first, Roosevelt thought of a constitutional amendment adding justices but
decided it was impractical. Not only would an amendment require two-thirds vote of
both houses, but three-quarters of the states would have to approve it. Roosevelt was
worried that moneyed interests might buy up enough state legislatures to prevent passage,
plus it could take years. Roosevelt considered a Congressional action that would require
two-thirds or seven-ninths vote of the Court to declare an act of Congress or of the states
to be unconstitutional but realized the Court would declare such an act unconstitutional.55
Most likely some of the Supreme Court Justices would have liked to retire from
the bench, but the Economy Act of 1933 cut the amount of money they would receive at
retirement from $20,000 a year to $10,000 making it financially impossible for them to
resign. The two oldest of the four conservatives, Justices Van Devanter and Sutherland,
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could not afford to retire. A bill had been introduced in 1936 to provide the justices with
retirement with full salary for life, and once it was passed the problem would solve itself.
Roosevelt had not thought it through and was determined to bulldoze the court into
submission.56
On February 5, 1937, Roosevelt sent to Congress a proposal for reorganization of
the judiciary. It was not unusual to change the number of judges, it had been done in
past, Roosevelt message said. The message was clothed in concern for the judicial work
load. In the past year, Roosevelt continued the court had declined to grant review in 695
out of 803 cases. The tone was gratuitously wounding, in that it equated the age of the
justices with incompetence, saying some are unable to perceive their own infirmities. To
revitalize the Court Roosevelt recommended that when a federal judge who had served at
least ten years waited more than six months past his seventieth birthday to resign, the
President might add a new judge to the bench. He could appoint as many as six new
justices to the Supreme Court. Roosevelt had told none of the Congressional leaders
ahead of time about the pending proposal for changes to the Supreme Court and that
would prove to be a major mistake.57
In attempting to alter the Supreme Court, Roosevelt had attacked one of the
symbols that many believed the nation needed and the public and Congress would react.
Roosevelt had violated his own method of making sure he had support before continuing
with a program. Most of the legal profession was against the plan.
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Congressmen were deluged with letters expressing intense anxiety over the fate of the
Court. Men who had feared to oppose his economic policies because they anticipated
popular disapproval now had the perfect justification for breaking with the President and
going with the people. Many liberals were disquieted by the Court plan and Roosevelt‟s
language that suggested he not only wanted to reform the Court but to humiliate it.58
The Senate Judiciary Committee opened hearings on the court reorganization bill.
Senator Wheeler from Montana wanted to give the justices every opportunity to defend
themselves against the accusations against them; therefore, he had secretly contacted
Chief Justice Hughes on the advice of Brandeis. Hughes wrote a letters for Wheeler to
read to the Judiciary Committee. Before reading the letter Wheeler told the committee
members that he a statement from a man who knows more about the Court than the
President of the United States, than the Attorney-General, than I do or any member of
this committee. The letter explained in detail that the court was fully abreast of its work,
destroying the president‟s main argument. More judges the letter said would only make
for inefficiency and delay. It was a shocking departure for a chief justice to give an
opinion on a bill affecting the court and it had a tremendous impact on the committee
members. 59
On March 29 the Supreme Court upheld the minimum wage law of the state of
Washington in a 5 to 4 decision. On the same day it approved an act on farm mortgages,
which it had previously struck down, and the collective bargaining provisions of the
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Railway Labor Act. Two weeks later the Court upheld the Wagner Act. There were a
host of similar decisions. The Court recognized that America had graduated from the era
of unrestrained and government-encouraged capitalist expansion and was becoming a
modified welfare state, and no matter how much the Justices did not like the
development, even by invoking the Constitution they could not stop it. By summer of
1937 there was no longer a need for the judiciary reorganization bill and it was
permanently shelved by the Senate. Within two and half years Roosevelt named five
appointees to the nine-man Supreme Court.60
In 1944 Roosevelt was nominated for an unprecedented fourth term as president
and won the election, but three months after his inauguration he suffered a massive stoke
and died. Harry S. Truman succeeded him as President. During his two terms in office
Truman experienced problems with the conservative coalition in Congress and many of
his Fair Deal proposals were defeated.
At the height of the Korean War, on April 5, 1952, the Steelworkers‟ Union gave
notice of a nationwide strike. Three days later, President Truman issued an executive
order instructing Secretary of Commerce Charles Sawyer to seize and operate the
nation‟s steel mills. Secretary Sawyer directed the companies‟ president to operate the
facilities in compliance with government regulations. Truman took the view that his
action was valid under the powers invested in him as president and commander in chief.
The purpose of the Taft-Hartley Act was to allow the parties to arrive at a settlement and
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to permit Congress to get involved if collective bargaining was unsuccessful. In a series
of rapid lower court rulings the case, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, reached
the Supreme Court in May 1952. The fact that Congress in considering the Taft-Hartley
Act had specifically rejected a seizure provision in the act could only be interpreted as a
prohibition against executive seizure. The Court‟s decision rejected the argument that the
President had inherent constitutional authority to issue an executive order seizing private
steel mills. The Court ruled that Truman had overstepped his authority by assuming
powers delegated to the legislative branch and not the executive branch.61
Since the decision in 1896 that held that state-imposed racial segregation in public
facilities was not unreasonable and therefore did not violate the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, many states had instituted the policy of segregation.
Beginning in the mid-1930s groups had brought suits at the state and then the federal
level challenging, on constitutional ground, the legal grounds for segregation of the races.
In 1950 the Court in two cases invalidated segregation in graduate and law schools,
noting the inequality of facilities. In 1952, a landmark case, Brown v. Board of
Education, was first argued in front of the Supreme Court. On May 17, 1954, the nation
anxiously waited to hear the Court‟s decision. Chief Justice Earl Warren gave the
decision for the Court declaring that segregation by race in public school was
unconstitutional. Warren said the changing prominence and social role that public schools
had assumed in the twentieth century could not be done by segregating races. He
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continued that education was the most important function of the state and local
government and where the state provided schools they must be made available to all on
equal terms.62 Warren then addressed what constituted “equal terms,” and the
formulation he used yielded the conclusion that separate facilities are inherently
unequal.63 The unanimous declaration of the Supreme Court that racial segregation
violated the spirit and the letter of the Constitution was transmitted around the world
being translated into thirty-four languages. The prestige of the Supreme Court, as well as
the nation, increased tremendously with the Court‟s decision; but not because of
Congressional legislation, nor from executive initiative but from the authority of the court
to declare a law or parts thereof at a state level as unconstitutional. The Supreme Court
had made law without making legislation. However, the decision revealed the deep nature
of race hostility in the United States that would be dealt with for many more years. The
Supreme Court established its essential role in determining the ultimate meaning of
freedom in the United States.64
During his tenure in office, President Richard M. Nixon made unprecedented
public pronouncements criticizing the Supreme Court and systematically took step to
alter past decisions of the Court. He sent directives to the federal bureaucracy to ignore
certain rules pursuant to the enforcement of federal court rulings. He sent a
recommendation to Congress suggesting that the jurisdiction of the federal court should
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be restricted so they could not render decisions on some issues. The actions and
suggestion of President Nixon while not ignored were not enacted.65
During the twentieth century the Supreme Court made rulings of cases that
concerned education, civil rights, individual rights, and the constitutionality of many state
and federal laws. One concerned the rights of an individual to be provided legal counsel
when questioned or charged with a crime, but different rulings and legislation altered the
original court decision several times during the century. A woman‟s right to have an
abortion was decided in Roe v. Wade, but on a number of occasions has been reargued in
front of the Court but without changes.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION

The framers of the Constitution of the United States created a document so
ambiguous as to allow the interpretation of its meanings to be flexible enough for the
problems associated with a growing and expanding nation. They made this document the
“Supreme Law of the Land.” They created an independent branch of government whose
sole duty is to interpret whether or not a state or federal law falls within the limits of the
Constitution. The Supreme Court is the conscience of the Constitution. Thomas Hobbes,
the great essayist, wrote, “It is not wisdom, but authority that makes a law.”66 The
Supreme Court has the authority to say what law according to the Constitution is because
from their earliest roots Americans possessed a strong respect for law and justice and
placed their trust in the integrity of the court to protect their individual liberties from
usurpation by the other branches of government in who they have little faith.
Alexis de Tocqueville recognized that the United States had constituted and then
made legal a powerful judiciary to act as guardian of the rights of the people. This
powerful judiciary, the Supreme Court, protected the people and the Constitution from
illegal acts originating in both the executive and legislative branches of the government at
state and federal levels. Tocqueville noted there was hardly a “political question in the
United States which did not sooner or later turn into a judicial one.” Political issues,
although sometimes controversial, that the court has decided include executive orders,
presidential directives, and one presidential election. But while these decisions have on
66
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occasion produced criticism of the court from many directions, in the end the position
and especially the authority of the court to make those decisions remain unchanged.
Court critics have not been able to diminish the power and authority of court nor even
with some questionable decisions has the court‟s integrity been permanently damaged in
the eyes of Americans, who still blame individual justices for bad decisions and not the
court system. One reason that the court receives major respect today from the general
public is because they are rarely seen on the political circuits because they are not elected
either directly or indirectly by the people but appointed by the president and confirmed
by the Senate. Unlike politicians who must belittle opponents and in the process espouse
in their propaganda, lies, and half-truths, justices are viewed as superior because they are
outside of this part of the political sphere. The organizational integrity of the Court has
not been touched.67
While Presidents appoint Supreme Court Justices who they believe will follow
their philosophy, once on the court justices have surprised the presidents who appointed
them. Many individuals before being appointed to the court hold other high offices to
which they must at least publicly profess to follow the political policies of the president,
otherwise they lose their jobs. Once appointed to the Supreme Court they have a lifetime
job unless an impeachable crime is committed. No Supreme Court Justice has ever been
removed from office by the impeachment process. In the final analysis the Supreme
Court is composed of men and women who take with them to the court their experiences,
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prejudices, and at times political beliefs. The Court is held in high regard by the public
and generally by the elected branches that interact with the institution. Part of that
respect stems from the fact that the public traditionally believes that the Court largely acts
in a disinterested fashion, weighing the facts and paying attention to the Constitution and
precedents. The public expects the Supreme Court to protect their rights as citizens
against infringement from unjust laws and this expectation of the court illustrates the
acknowledgement of the people concerning the power of the court.68
While Alexander Hamilton professed to believe that the Supreme Court would be
the weakest branch of the government, his private conversations with like-minded people
expressed the belief that it would indeed be powerful because it would be the final power
over the interpretation of law in the Constitution. Hamilton and others of his generation
realized the tremendous need for a powerful judiciary to constrain the ambitions of
political powers while protecting the rights and liberties of individual citizens while at the
same time they recognized potential fears because of abuses the colonists suffered at the
hands of the English monarchy. The Supreme Court is the most powerful branch of the
Government because of the respect and authority given it by the Constitution, the Federal
Judiciary Act of 1789, and the people of the United States of America. It is the only
branch of government that can act alone to interpret the Constitution and laws legislated
by the federal or state legislatures. Specific decisions of the Court have been nullified by
amendments to the Constitution. On rare occasions the jurisdiction of the court has been
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temporarily curtailed and once with an amendment that permanently withdrew from the
court the power to hear and decide suits against any state that does not wish to be sued.
These were comparatively minor and peripheral restrictions on the Court‟s power
because instead of suing the state, its governor or other state official who acts
unconstitutionally is sued. The organizational integrity of the court has not been
diminished by any act of Congress or by any constitutional amendment. No member of
the Court has ever been removed from it other than death, voluntary resignation, or
retirement.
When the Court ruled that Truman‟s seizure of the steel mills was
unconstitutional, he turned the mills back to their officers and directors. In 1954, the
Court crippled the Congressional campaign against domestic Communism and
subversion, Congress protested, but accepted the limitations placed on it. When the
Court in 1954 handed down a decision against the South‟s social system of racial
segregation they protested loud and long, but resigned themselves to desegregation,
delaying as long as possible to implement the decision. When the Court told Nixon he
had to turn over tapes to an independent investigation, he complied. As Hamilton said,
the President as commander-in-chief is afforded enormous power to affect his will and
Congress is the only agency of the federal government that can levy taxes, thus they have
control of the purse strings. The states control their own revenues and maintain strong
police forces.69 The Supreme Court has none of these instruments of power and yet it
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prevails over the others because in the final analysis the integrity, authority, and respect
for the Court comes from the Constitution and the people. The framers could only hope in
their wildest dreams to have established such a strong branch of government; one that is
above both the executive and the legislative branches.
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